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INTRODUCTION 
The Global Recession of 2008 and ensuing austerity measures have 
renewed the urgency surrounding the call for fundamental tax reform.1 In the 
United States, the so-called “fiscal cliff” and the automatic budget cuts imposed 
under the name of “sequestration” have decisively linked tax reform with the 
ongoing fight over budget priorities, both in the minds of the American public and 
their elected representatives.2 This brinksmanship approach to policy making has 
squarely placed tax reform within the wider rubric of fiscal reform, thus marking 
the end of tax exceptionalism and severely compromising the established goal of 
revenue neutrality.3 Tax reform in the face of staggering federal deficits will have 
to respond to political concerns over revenue and spending levels, and there will 
be clear “winners and losers.”4 Before embarking on fundamental tax reform, 
however, this Article proposes adding a critical lens to existing U.S. tax policy to 
ensure that any proposals for change are informed, transparent, and responsive to 
the needs and abilities of individual taxpayers. 
                                                 
1
 Nelson D. Schwartz, Austerity Reigns Over Euro Zone as Crisis Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2012, at A1. See also MARK BYLTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (2013) 
(describing the roots of “austerity” as an economic political strategy). In terms of fundamental tax 
reform, this Article focuses almost exclusively on issues related to the federal personal income tax. 
2
 Jennifer Steinhauer, Under Pressure, House Approves Senate Tax Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2013, at A1.  
3
 The term “tax exceptionalism” is most frequently used in the context of administrative law 
norms where taxpayers have long-argued that Treasury regulations were entitled to a lower 
standard of deference than required by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The notion that “tax is different” for purposes of 
judicial review was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Education and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 716 (2011). See Kristin E. Hickman, The 
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 
1541 (2006) (arguing against the view that “tax is different or special” and therefore, not like other 
areas of law).  
4
 See THE PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY PANEL, THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM 
OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION [hereinafter PERAP TAX 
REPORT] (August 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf. 
According to the Report, “revenue neutrality by income class might result in increases or 
decreases in tax liability for subgroups or individual taxpayers within each income class—that is, 
revenue neutrality might result in ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’” Id. at v. When looking at tax reform 
across income class, the prospect of raising tax rates for higher income taxpayers has led to 
charges of “class warfare.” See Doug Bandow, The Path To Tax Reform: Cutting Taxes For Those 
Who Pay For Them, FORBES, Sept. 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/09/10/the-path-to-tax-reform-cutting-taxes-for-
those-who-pay-for-them/ (observing that “[t]axes also offer a means for the Democrats to play 
their traditional class war card”).  
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In many ways, traditional tax policy is ill-equipped to navigate the political 
demands and trade-offs inherent in fiscal reform.5 Primarily focused on macro 
distributional concerns, the public welfare perspective of traditional tax policy 
intentionally looks past the identities of individual taxpayers, with the exception 
of income level.6 It is self-consciously indifferent to the impact that taxation can 
have on existing social, political, and economic disparities in terms of 
participation or access and does not acknowledge the various ways that tax policy 
can reinforce existing inequities or biases.7 As a result, our facially neutral tax 
practices can sometimes produce a string of unintended consequences that, 
although objectively undesirable, traditional tax policy would consider both 
irrelevant to its goals and beyond its power to correct.8 Critical tax policy can help 
policymakers evaluate these unintended consequences and pierce the structural 
assumptions of neutrality.  
It has been almost thirty years since the United States last undertook the 
collective project of fundamental tax reform. 9  Since that time, a growing 
international consensus has emerged regarding the connection between taxation 
and inequality,10 as well as a sophisticated and vibrant critique of the U.S. tax 
                                                 
5
 Albert R. Hunt, Slim Chance for Tax Fix as Things Are, INT’L HERALD TRIB, Mar. 18, 2013, at 2 
(asserting that increasing polarization in Congress makes a major tax “overhaul next to 
impossible”). 
6
 See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
(2002). Murphy and Nagel assert that: “Justice or injustice in taxation can only mean justice or 
injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax regime.” 
Id. at 8. 
7
 See id. at 26 (discussing the “purely economic impact” of the “justice of taxation”).  
8
 For example, the combined effect of the marital filing provisions and the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) has historically produced a strong penalty upon marriage for low-income taxpayers 
eligible for the EITC. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 146-50 (1997); see also Ann 
L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided some 
relief for the marriage penalty and expended the credit for some families, but it did not eliminate 
the penalty. John J. Fichtner & Jacob Feldman, Taxing Marriage: Microeconomic Behavioral 




 The result was the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which drastically broadened the tax base and 
flattened rates while adhering to the mandate of revenue neutrality. Bruce Bartlett, The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986: Should We Do It Again?, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Oct. 18, 2011, 6:00AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/the-tax-reform-act-of-1986-should-we-do-it-
again/. See also JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: 
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).  
10
 See, e.g., UNDP, Issues Brief: Gender Equality and Poverty Reduction – Taxation (Apr. 2010), 
available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/gender/Gender%20and%20Poverty%20Reduction/
Taxation%20English.pdf. This consensus has recognized that even the best intended tax systems 
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policy known as critical tax theory.11 This Article explores how the insights of 
both developments can lead to the creation of a critical tax policy that is built on 
the articulation of difference rather than false assumptions of sameness. It argues 
for a tax policy that is transparent and responsive to individuals; one that 
acknowledges its constitutive role as part of a larger “blueprint for the aims and 
ambitions of the nation state.”12  
In many ways, these insights build on the tax expenditure concept that is 
now an accepted mainstay of tax policy. 13  Originally developed to further 
transparency and promote better budgeting practices, the tax expenditure concept 
exposes how a tax system designed to raise revenue can also contain hidden 
expenditures in the form of indirect spending.14  In the 1970s, Stanley Surrey 
argued that the failure to acknowledge the vast indirect spending in the tax code 
compromised the integrity of the budgeting process.15  Congress responded by 
mandating the creation of the Tax Expenditure Budget, which accounts for the 
indirect spending by budget function.16  
The three classic pillars of tax policy—equity, efficiency, and ease of 
administration—aim to design a system of taxation that fairly apportions the 
burdens of citizenship, minimizes tax distortions in economic behavior, and 
simplifies the task of compliance and administration. 17  These organizing 
principles reflect widely-held equality and autonomy norms but proceed from a 
very strong presumption of taxpayer neutrality where the only salient distinction 
among taxpayers is that of income level.18 In other words, U.S. tax policy does 
not take into account demographic differences among taxpayers, such as race, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity, nor does it attempt to 
                                                                                                                                     
have the ability to entrench existing disparities, and it has urged policy makers “to be aware of the 
extent to which tax policies . . . reinforce or break down. . . inequalities.” Id. at 4. 
11
 See, e.g., CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford 
eds., 2009) (excerpting over fifty articles written from a critical tax theory perspective).  
12
 ANN MUMFORD, TAX POLICY, WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (2009) (crediting Joseph Schumpeter 
with the observation regarding the budget function).  
13
 See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 
(1973). 
14
 See also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).  
15
 SURREY, supra note 13. Stanley Surrey was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax 
Policy in 1968 when he coined the term “tax expenditures” to refer to provisions that represented a 
departure from the normally accepted principles of income and are designed to achieve the same 
results usually accomplished through direct spending. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, A 
RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS (May 12, 2008), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1196. 
16
 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–344, 
88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688 (2006)). 
17
 C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY US TAX POLICY 10 (2004).  
18
 Id. (“In the tax laws, horizontal equity—often called equal justice—asserts that those with equal 
ability to pay should pay equal taxes”). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2012 
 
 210
evaluate the potentially disparate impact of taxation on the members of these 
groups.19 The Internal Revenue Service does not collect information regarding 
demographic characteristics, making it extremely difficult to “put a face on 
America’s tax returns.”20 
By viewing taxpayers only in terms of income level, tax policy is free to 
consider distributional issues without having to account for countervailing 
concerns such as gender or race equity.21 For example, the fiction of taxpayer 
neutrality is a constituent feature of optimal tax theory, which seeks to maximize 
social welfare by identifying the optimal tax base.22 Increasingly, however, this 
strong presumption of tax neutrality is out of step with emerging international 
norms.23 Tax equity initiatives undertaken by the United Nations, NGOs, and 
adopted by numerous countries all recognize the connection between gender and 
taxation.24 For example, a 2010 United Nations Development Programme Issues 
Brief cautions that “[p]olicy makers need to be aware of the extent to which tax 
policies . . . reinforce or break down gender inequalities.”25 
                                                 
19
 The Internal Review Service (IRS) does not collect demographic data, thereby complicating any 
attempt to “put a face on America’s tax returns.” The Tax Foundation, a non-partisan tax research 
group, has started a project called Putting a Face on America’s Tax Returns that is designed to 
provide enhanced information about who actually pays taxes. Tax Foundation, Putting a Face on 
America’s Tax Returns: A Chart Book (2012), available at 
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/putting_a_face_on_americas_tax_return
s_chartbook.pdf.  The project uses tax statistics and Census data, but it does not provide a 
breakdown of the information based on race, ethnicity, or gender. Id. It does provide information 




 Tony Infanti refers to the sole focus on income as the “homogenizing effect.” Anthony C. 
Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1206 (2007-2008) (discussing “equity’s systematic 
erasure of all but the economic dimension of individuals”). 
22
 See generally J.A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis, 6 JOUR. PUBL. ECON. 327 (1976) 
(outlining necessary conditions for optimal taxation). 
23
 See generally TAXATION AND GENDER EQUITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIRECT AND 
INDIRECT TAXES IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Caren Grown & Imraan Valodia 
eds., 2010) (examining the relationship between gender and taxation in eight countries: Argentina, 
Ghana, India, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda, and the United Kingdom). 
24
 See UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10. For example, the United Kingdom and South Africa 
“have undertaken reforms to remove explicit gender biases in their personal income tax laws, no 
personal income tax system can yet be classified as transforming unequal gender relations.” Caren 
Grown, Taxation and Gender Equality: A Conceptual Framework, in TAXATION AND GENDER 
EQUITY, supra note 23, at 1, 17. A number of countries have instituted gender-responsive 
budgeting initiatives, starting with Australia in 1994. UN Women, Gender Responsive Budgeting, 
http://www.gender-
budgets.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=112 (last visited Sept. 
4, 2013). To date, there are over forty gender-responsive-budgeting initiatives being implemented 
across the world. Id.  
25
 Id. at 4. 
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The presumption of taxpayer neutrality has also come under sustained 
critique by a group of U.S. tax scholars who self-identify as critical tax scholars 
and write from a relatively diverse range of perspectives, including critical race 
theory,26 feminist legal theory,27 and queer theory.28 These critical tax scholars 
have exposed implicit bias in the tax system by examining facially neutral tax 
provisions to illustrate how existing tax law and policy can both reflect and 
reinforce disparities based on race or ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender or 
gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, and disability.29  They have also 
explored explicit bias by engaging the more obviously gendered or otherwise 
exclusionary provisions of the tax code, such as the marital provisions,30 and the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the joint filing provisions.31  
U.S. tax policy debates have largely ignored the international developments 
connecting taxation with inequality, as well as the contributions of critical tax 
scholars.32  This Article argues that federal tax policy would benefit from the 
addition of a critical lens or perspective and explores a number of ways to 
integrate these collective insights toward the creation of a truly critical tax policy. 
By considering the impact of tax policy on marginalized taxpayers at the outset, 
policymakers will have the opportunity to avoid (or at least openly acknowledge) 
the types of persistent disparities and inequities that have been catalogued by 
                                                 
26
 See, e.g., Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 
1996 WIS. L. Rev. 751(1996); Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and 
White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787 (1997); Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to 
LatCrit, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 575 (2001); Mylinh Uy, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian 
Americans, 11 ASIAN L. J. 117 (2004). 
27
 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional 
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571 
(1996); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Taxing Woman: The Relationship of Feminist Scholarship to 
Tax, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 301 (1997). 
28
 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 
REV. LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1991); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and 
Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998); Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue 
Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004). 
29
 See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the 
Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053 (2006). 
30
 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 8, at 58-88 (describing the joint filing provision and the 
“marriage penalty” and “marriage bonus”). 
31
 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI. KENT L. REV. 481, 
483 (2009). As a result of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Windsor, legally 
married same-sex couples are now considered married for federal tax purposes. See infra text 
accompanying notes 164-72.  
32
 Critical tax scholarship was the subject of intense criticism by mainstream tax scholars. In 1998, 
the North Carolina Law Review devoted an entire issue to an extended critique of critical tax 
theory. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV 1749, 
1749 (1998); Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited 
Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV 1729, 1734 (1998). 
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critical tax scholars and international tax equity efforts. In this way, the addition 
of a critical lens has the potential to reveal the false neutrality of tax provisions, 
just as the tax expenditure concept made indirect spending visible to policymakers 
in the 1970s. 33 Professor Stanley Surrey taught a generation that the choice not to 
tax is often equivalent to spending.34 Similarly, critical tax policy can illustrate 
how stated considerations of equity and neutrality could actually serve to reify 
and perpetuate inequity.35  
Critical tax scholars have identified three common themes that have direct 
relevance for U.S. tax policy makers: (1) current taxpayer information is 
insufficient to measure the incidence of taxation across different demographics; 
(2) neutrality principles can obscure existing disparities in the distribution of tax 
benefits and burdens; and (3) the insistence on taxpayer neutrality can lead to 
unintended and undesirable consequences. This article takes up each of these 
issues in turn and addresses how each concern could be addressed within the 
existing income tax system using familiar administrative or legislative measures. 
For example, the question of insufficient taxpayer information could be addressed 
through enhanced data collection. Although this solution may present its own set 
of negative externalities and objections, it illustrates that the answer to the basic 
question posed by critical tax theory—how is the burden of taxation allocated 
across different groups within society—is not unknowable.36 
                                                 
33
 See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current 
Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 263 (1979). 
34
 Id. Surrey and McDaniel explained the distinction between direct and indirect spending as 
follows:  
Put differently, whenever government decides to favor an activity or group 
through monetary assistance, it may elect from a wide range of methods in 
delivering that assistance. Direct assistance may take the form of a government 
grant or subsidy, a government loan, perhaps at a special interest rate, or a 
private loan guaranteed by the government: Instead of direct assistance, the 
government may work within the income tax system to reduce the tax otherwise 
owed by a favored activity or group. 
Id. at 228. 
35
 Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION, at xxii (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009) (noting “critical tax 
scholars’ assertion that the tax laws . . . reflect and even reify discrimination based on race, 
gender, sexual orientation, class, disability, or family structure”). 
36
 Enhanced data collection would also answer a longstanding evidentiary objection to the critical 
tax project, namely that it was impossible to substantiate disparate impact because there is no 
national data set of taxpayer information based on race or other identity characteristics. Richard 
Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal Income Tax: Has A Disparate Impact Case Been Made?, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1834 (1998). As explained infra in Part III, this objection presents a classic 
Catch-22 and illustrates the closed nature of a tax policy bounded by neutrality. Critical tax theory 
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The two remaining concerns could also be addressed through enhanced 
reporting and transparency, which admittedly would also raise a host of questions. 
With respect to the issue of the disparate distribution of tax benefits and burdens, 
the practice of gender-sensitive budgeting has shown that it is possible (and 
sometimes desirable) to track expenditures and spending to determine the impact 
of programs and policies on specific disadvantaged groups within society. 37 
Critical tax policy would support the creation of a diversity expenditure budget to 
provide essential information to tax policy makers regarding the incidence and 
burden of taxation that would not only be relevant for tax purposes but also for 
broader social-entitlement programs.38 The question of unintended consequences 
could likewise be addressed at the outset through the use of a diversity impact 
assessment that would be analogous to an environmental impact statement39 or the 
minority impact assessments that are gaining support at the state level, especially 
in the context of sentencing issues.40 Each of these proposals would further the 
goals of critical tax policy to make tax policy more informed, transparent, and 
responsive to the needs of individual taxpayers, but each proposal also comes 
with its own set of costs. Accordingly, they do not represent an exhaustive list but 
rather a starting point for the ongoing project of building a truly critical tax 
policy. 
The first Part of the Article engages the multiple claims of neutrality within 
U.S. tax policy. Arguing that tax policy should be viewed as a component of 
fiscal policy, it uses the insights of both international tax equity initiatives and 
critical tax scholarship to make the case for greater transparency. Part II then 
                                                                                                                                     
cannot substantiate its claims because there is no national data set of taxpayer information that 
includes demographic information such as race, gender, or ethnicity. Federal income tax returns do 
not collect information on race because under prevailing tax policy the only salient distinguishing 
feature between taxpayers is income level.  
37
 See generally Lisa Phillips & Miranda Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, Domestic 
Laws, and the Politics of Budgets, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 797, 843 (2009) (describing the advent of 
“gender budgeting”). 
38
 In 1998, Beverly Moran proposed that Congress should be required to prepare a “Race 
Expenditure Budget.” Beverly I. Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can We Ever Know Anything 
About Race and Tax? 76 N.C.L. REV. 1629, 1634 (1998).  
39
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (2011), requiring the development of the Environmental Impact 
Statement. 
40
 In 2008, Iowa enacted legislation requiring a “minority impact statement” for all legislative 
action involving sentencing. Dana Boone, Iowa to Require ‘Minority Impact Statements’ for 
Proposed Criminal Legislation, IOWA INDEP. Apr. 17, 2008, available at 
http://iowaindependent.com/2220/iowa-to-require-minority-impact-statements-for-proposed-
criminal-legislation (reporting on background of bill). The law gained support after statistics 
showed that Iowa led the nation in its rate of incarceration for African Americans. Id. The sponsor 
of the bill called the impact statement “a remarkable step in addressing the special circumstances 
of Iowa’s minority population.” Id. For more information on the Iowa minority impact statement, 
see infra text accompanying notes 288-92.  
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moves to consider the construction of the critical lens. It discusses how to 
determine which characteristics or group identifications are salient for purposes of 
tax policy, recognizing that these conclusions can evolve and change over time 
and across cultures. It also applies the lens to three different examples of bias 
common in tax matters: explicit, implicit, and discretionary bias. Part III proposes 
ways to enforce or implement the critical lens through policy innovations or 
safeguards that draw on longstanding institutional practices and procedures. These 
proposals include: (1) enhanced information collection; (2) the creation of a 
diversity expenditure budget; and (3) the requirement of a diversity impact 
statement. A brief conclusion acknowledges the additional costs and 
considerations involved with each of these proposals and reiterates that this is 
only the beginning of a much longer conversation regarding how to develop an 
informed, transparent, and responsive critical tax policy: one that recognizes that 
the goal of equity does not demand the denial of difference.  
I. THE COSTS OF FALSE NEUTRALITY 
It goes without saying that the choices that a society makes regarding what, 
whom, and when to tax can reveal quite a bit about what a society values.41 In the 
United States, our tax policy does not inquire as to the effects of taxation on 
historically disadvantaged groups or marginalized populations, but instead 
focuses solely on income level. This post-identity approach reflects a strong 
commitment to equality of opportunity and the desirability of an identity-blind 
society. It also has obvious advantages for economic modeling.42 It does not, 
however, reflect the lived experience of millions of individuals for whom 
                                                 
41
 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Through the Looking Glass With Alice and Larry: The Nature 
of Scholarship, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1609, 1609 (1998) (noting that “taxes also tell us more generally 
about our society since what we tax and how we tax reflect a multitude of philosophical, social, 
and political choices”). 
42
 With respect to the theory of optimal taxation, Linda Sugin observed: 
Users of the model can input various patterns of income distribution and 
efficiency costs of taxation to evaluate alternative tax regimes. The model is 
amenable to different definitions of distributional fairness and can adjust to 
accommodate specific limitations in tax design that may arise from political or 
administrative constraints. Because of the model’s wide range and flexibility, 
the optimal tax literature is extensive, and offers insights on many fundamental 
tax policy issues, including the two most paradigmatic—progressivity and 
choice of tax base.  
Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 229 
(2011). 
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numerous and overlapping identity markers—race, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity—continue to have social and political salience. 
The importance of these identity characteristics are not lost on policy 
makers in a number of other contexts, such as labor and employment, health care, 
and housing. In each of these areas, federal policy specifically addresses the 
impact of legislative and regulatory choices on historically disadvantaged groups 
and marginalized populations.43 A critical approach to tax policy maintains that, 
as a component of a larger “blueprint” of collective goals and priorities, taxation 
should acknowledge the continued relevance of identity characteristics, existing 
disparities, and persistent inequities. Moreover, it should recognize that the failure 
to take these considerations into account can lead to unintended consequences—
facially neutral tax policy can sometimes reinforce and reify the very inequities 
that it currently chooses to ignore. 
This Part engages the multiple claims of neutrality that combine to construct 
the prevailing understanding of tax exceptionalism. 44  It first discusses the 
spending function that is inherent within the current structure of the personal 
income tax and the transparency gains afforded by the tax expenditure concept. It 
then focuses on the neutrality fictions inherent in traditional tax policy and the 
growing international consensus regarding the important connection between 
taxation and equality goals. A final section explores the critical tax theory 
movement in greater detail and describes its major contributions, as well as the 
less than welcoming reception it has received from mainstream tax scholars 
committed to taxpayer neutrality.  
A. All Part of a Larger “Blueprint” 
In 2011, the federal government received $2.3 trillion in revenues, of which 
$1.1 trillion came from the personal income tax.45 However, the amount that the 
federal government could have collected through the personal income tax was 
considerably higher—almost twice that amount. Budget estimates for 2011 show 
that the federal personal income tax distributed to taxpayers over $965 billion in 
                                                 
43
 For a discussion of the many instances where the federal government collects and uses 
demographic information, see infra text accompanying notes 221-32.  
44
 The term tax exceptionalism is most often used to refer to a longstanding argument that 
Treasury Regulations should not be granted the same degree of judicial deference as directed 
under Chevron. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). For a discussion of tax exceptionalism and the belief that “tax is different” see 
supra note 3. 
45
 Jonathan Schwabish & Courtney Griffith, The U.S. Federal Budget, Congressional Budget 
Office, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/budgetinfographic.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2013). The revenue from the personal income tax represented 7.3% of GDP. Id. 
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tax expenditures,46 representing instances where the federal government chose not 
to collect revenue in order to further other important social or economic policy 
goals.47 Tax expenditures are sprinkled liberally throughout the tax code in the 
form of exclusions, deductions, and credits. In each case, the decision to forego 
revenue represents a form of indirect spending, such as when the federal 
government chooses to subsidize home ownership through the mortgage interest 
deduction or subsidize health care through the medical expense deduction.48 
In the 1970s, Stanley Surrey lobbied strenuously to have this indirect 
spending represented in the federal budget.49 Recognizing that the amounts in 
questions were significant, Surrey argued that the federal government’s choice to 
forego revenue to which it is entitled is equivalent to spending. 50  The 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 adopted Surrey’s 
tax expenditure concept and required the creation of a tax expenditure budget to 
accompany the regular direct-spending budget.51 Organized by budget function, 
the tax expenditure budget is designed to both give policymakers important 
distributional information, as well as to make them more accountable for the 
indirect spending that they authorize through the tax code.52  As a theoretical 
construct, tax expenditure analysis is now widely accepted, 53  although 
                                                 
46
 Donald B. Marron, How Large Are Tax Expenditures?, TAX NOTES 1597 (March 28, 2011), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001526-Expenditure-Estimates.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2013). 
47
 See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33, at 228 (explaining that tax expenditures “[w]hatever 
their form . . . essentially represent government spending for the favored activities or groups”). 
48
 The mortgage interest deduction is allowed under section 163(h) of the I.R.C. §163(h) (2012). 
The medical expense deduction is allowed under section 213 of the IRC.  
49
 SURREY, supra note 13. 
50
 Surrey and McDaniel explained that tax expenditures are: 
departures from the normal tax structure, designed to favor a particular industry, 
activity, or class of persons. Tax subsidies partake of many forms, such as 
permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, 
credits against tax, or special rates. Whatever their form, these departures from 
the “normative” income tax structure essentially represent government spending 
for the favored activities or groups through the tax system rather than through 
direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance. 
Id. at 228. 
51
 The Treasury Department published its first tax expenditure budget in 1968. Id. at 226.  
52
 In addition, since 1972 the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has produced its own tax 
expenditure list annually. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates Of Federal Tax Expenditures 
For Fiscal Years 2012-2017, Feb. 1, 2013, available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4504 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).  
53
 Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33, at 227 (reporting in 1979 that there had been “a rapid and 
expanding recognition of that role the tax expenditure concept has in tax policy issues and budget 
policy issues”).  
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commentators have continuously questioned the appropriate way to distinguish 
tax expenditures from the more structural components of the income tax.54 The 
increased transparency resulting from this wide acceptance does not seem to have 
dampened the appeal of tax expenditures. In 2011, the total amount of the 
personal income tax expenditures exceeded the defense budget.55 
There are numerous reasons why such high levels of indirect spending are 
orchestrated through the personal income tax—some pragmatic and some 
ideological. On the pragmatic side, the existing infrastructure of the tax system 
allows Congress to engage in spending programs without the start-up costs 
associated with new bureaucracy.56 The complexity of the tax code also affords 
legislators the opportunity to hide subsidies for special interests far from the 
prying eyes of watchdog groups.57 From an ideological perspective, some policy 
makers might find it preferable to provide an indirect benefit to taxpayers, rather 
                                                 
54
 Even its critics recognize that “[t]ax expenditure analysis has produced useful information for 
legislators and tax policymakers, highlighting potential tax reforms and revenue raisers.” Edward 
A. Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, YALE 
L. J., ONLINE, May 24, 2011, http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-
court/winn-and-the-inadvisability-of-constitutionalizing-tax-expenditure-analysis. See also 
Douglas A. Kahn, A Proposed Replacement Of The Tax Expenditure Concept And A Different 
Perspective On Accelerated Depreciation, FLA. STA. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). When the 
Joint Committee on Taxation reconsidered its definition of a tax expenditure in 2008, it concluded  
[the] principal utility [of the tax expenditure concept] appears to have been as a 
tool of tax policy and tax distributional analysis. The rhetoric of tax expenditure 
analysis, and the economic reasoning that underlies that rhetoric, in fact can 
provide a successful framework by which to judge the fairness, efficiency and 
administrative consequences of many “incentive” proposals. Policymakers 
further can look to tax expenditure analysis to provide insight into “base 
broadening” and similar measures.  
Joint Committee on Taxation, A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis, May 12, 2008 
available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1196 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2013). 
55
 JONATHAN SCHWABISH & COURTNEY GRIFFITH, THE U.S. FEDERAL BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/budgetinfographic.pdf. The revenue 
from the personal income tax represented 7.3% of GDP. Id. 
56
 See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural 
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing that 
“a tax subsidy may be more efficient than an equivalent direct spending program because such a 
subsidy uses the pre-existing tax system to communicate federal policy at relatively low marginal 
cost”). 
57
 Id. at 1168 (noting a critique that tax expenditures were “not subject to the same scrutiny as 
direct monetary expenditures”). 
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than a direct transfer payment.58 Whatever the reason, the use of tax expenditures 
shows no signs of abating, even as fundamental tax reform has called into 
question the longevity of some of the more popular tax expenditures, such as the 
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance or the mortgage interest 
deduction.59 
Even with the high levels of indirect spending within the tax code, federal 
tax policy adheres to a strong presumption of taxpayer neutrality under which the 
only relevant factor is income level. As a result, the federal government can 
annually “spend,” in the form of tax expenditures, an amount greater than the total 
defense expenditures without any ability to account for who benefits. The myth of 
taxpayer neutrality means that not only does tax policy fail to track the 
distribution of tax burdens, but it also fails to track the allocation of benefits. 
Although this post-identity stance is useful for purposes of economic modeling, it 
is inconsistent with a more nuanced concern for equity expressed in other areas of 
federal policy, such as labor and employment, housing, and health care. In all of 
these areas, federal policy acknowledges that certain identity markers and 
classifications—such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and gender 
identity—continue to have social, political, and economic salience. 
Notwithstanding significant civil rights gains, this continued salience means that 
efforts to promote equity will at times require attention to difference.  
B. Hidden Choices and Embedded Values 
Despite the real life importance of differences, assumptions of neutrality 
abound in tax policy. There are frequently-voiced concerns over revenue 
neutrality, 60  marriage neutrality, 61  and the general overarching goal of tax 
                                                 
58
 The relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina provide an example of the preference for indirect 
tax relief. The initial attempt to provide emergency relief through debit cards was roundly 
criticized. Jordan Weissman, Did Katrina Victims Really Spend Their Relief Money on Gucci Bags 
and Massage Parlors? THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 31, 2012 ), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/10/did-katrina-victims-really-spend-their-relief-
money-on-gucci-bags-and-massage-parlors/264377/. Those attempts were followed by a 
comprehensive disaster tax relief bill, but many of its provisions represented significant departures 
from normal tax policy and procedure, such as allowing the victims to report the storm losses they 
incurred in 2005 on their 2004 amended tax returns in order to speed the refund. Katrina 
Emergency Tax Relief Act (P.L. 109-73). 
59
 The mortgage interest deduction for a personal residence is provided under IRC § 163(h). The 
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is found in IRC § 104. Both have been targeted 
in recent discussions on tax reform. Ezra Klein, Tax Reform is Going to Be Really, Really Hard, 




 Any large scale revamping of the tax system typically proceeds under the direction that the 
result must be “revenue neutral.” See Daniel Shaviro, Tax Reform Implications of the Risk of a 
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neutrality—meaning that a tax system should not distort economic decision 
making.62 In addition to these explicit claims of neutrality, the very language of 
taxation is premised on an assertion of neutrality and objectivity that is reinforced 
by the quasi-scientific character of the Internal Revenue Code and its voluminous 
Treasury Regulations.63 Unlike other areas of law, the bounded universe of the tax 
code appears to offer clear answers and solutions.64  In an almost mechanical 
manner, Revenue Rulings recite facts, apply the law unfettered by doubt or 
ambiguity, and pronounce generally applicable outcomes. The emphasis on 
objective facts and economic reality conveniently looks past individual 
differences and distinctions among taxpayers—with the exception of income 
level. The resulting “patina of neutrality” 65 can obscure the normative choices 
and value judgments that undergird contemporary tax policy. It can also retrench 
existing disparities and persistent inequities. 
1. Taxpayer neutrality 
One core neutrality principle that often remains unstated is that of taxpayer 
neutrality—the belief that identity characteristics are irrelevant for tax purposes.66 
Instead, taxpayers are viewed in the aggregate, as abstractions arranged by 
income level, which is itself an artificial construction of the tax code. 67 
                                                                                                                                     
U.S. Budget Catastrophe, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 577, 583 (2012) (noting that the “the 
dominant tax reform design has emphasized revenue neutrality, to be achieved by offsetting the 
revenue gain from base-broadening by lowering income tax rates). 
61
 For the classic statement on marriage neutrality, see Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation 
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395-96 (1975). 
62
 STEUERLE, supra note 17, at 10. 
63
 See McCaffery, supra note 8, at 1 (“The mainstream tax policy academy legitimated the 
structure of tax with a rhetoric of fairness, neutrality, and common sense.”). 
64
 Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
763, 767 (2004) (noting that “[i]n the traditional narrative, the Code is facially neutral and 
progressive; it seems to benefit and burden all groups and, on the whole, to be tilted in favor of the 
less fortunate because it demands less of them”). 
65
 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical 
Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 486-87 (1987). She argues persuasively that economic 
analysis “lends a patina of neutrality, because economics—particularly neoclassical economics—
is viewed by many non-economists (and even by some economists) as a ‘science,’ and therefore as 
factual and objective.” Id. 
66
 See Infanti, supra note 21, at 1206 (noting the “homogenizing effect”). In terms of non-identity 
based characteristics, the Code does take into account important factors such as, homeownership, 
head of household status, and marital status. It also provides special relief in the form of a higher 
standard deduction for taxpayers who are blind or 65 years of age or older. I.R.C. § 63(c)(3) 
(2006). 
67
 Charles O. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Scholarship Seriously—A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV. 
1749 (1998). Galvin rejected the inquiries of critical tax theory and argued that “[a] better course 
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Discussions regarding distributional concerns, questions of public welfare, and 
the all-important quest for the optimal tax base do not consider the incidence of 
taxation based on race or gender or ethnicity—only income level. With the 
exception of critical tax theory, even progressive critiques of the tax system tend 
to focus primarily on macro questions of economic or distributional justice that 
accept the notion of taxpayer neutrality.68  
The single focus on income level intentionally ignores other points of 
difference that continue to have social meaning and salience—race, gender, 
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity—and deems them to be 
irrelevant. As a result, tax policy is developed and implemented without regard to 
any number of characteristics that may have a bearing on an individual’s tax 
benefit or burden. The Report of President Obama’s Economic Recovery 
Advisory Panel (PERAP) provides an example of this type of policy making.69 
Tasked with simplifying the tax system in 2009, PERAP was directed by the 
President not to propose any reform that would raise “taxes on families with 
income of less than $250,000 a year.” 70  Although PERAP’s final 
recommendations complied with this directive, its report acknowledged that it 
“did not try to hold all taxpayers harmless in the options we evaluated.”71 To the 
contrary, its report admitted that “revenue neutrality by income class might result 
in increases or decreases in tax liability for subgroups or individual taxpayers 
                                                                                                                                     
is to achieve neutrality by the attainment as nearly as possible of a pure Haig-Simons 
comprehensive model or a pure consumed income model.” Id. at 1749. 
68
 See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 42, at 231. Linda Sugin presents a sophisticated and nuanced 
critique of optimal tax theory based on a “philosophical understanding of fairness that incorporates 
the role of taxation into a broader conception of a just society.” She observes that  
A fair tax must satisfy the full range of demands that a just society places on 
government exercising its coercive power over individuals. Applying that 
philosophical approach to tax fairness reveals significant deficiencies in the 
assumption that a tax on ability to earn is truly optimal as a matter of justice. 
Id. 
69
  PERAP TAX REPORT, supra note 4. PERAP was assigned three separate tasks: “simplifying the 
tax system, improving taxpayer compliance with existing tax laws, and reforming the corporate 
tax system.” Id. The President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Panel (PERAP) is an outside 
advisory panel comprised of academics, business leaders, and former government officials. Jeff 
Zeleny, Panel to Advise Obama on Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/business/07web-econ.html?_r=0. PERAP is currently called 
the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Anahad O’Connor, 
Volker Out, Immelt In On Economic Board, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/business/economy/ 21volcker.html.  
70
 PERAP TAX REPORT, supra note 4, at v. 
71
 Id. The Report continued that “it would be impossible to do without substantial costs in terms of 
lost revenues.” Id. 
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within each income class—that is, revenue neutrality might result in ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers.’”72 Despite this reality, PERAP urged Congress to “select changes 
that are desirable on their merits and not worry about the distributional effects of 
each of them individually.”73  
 The principle of taxpayer neutrality not only says that the distributional 
impact of the PERAP’s recommendations are irrelevant, it also ensures that they 
are impossible to measure because taxpayer data broken down by race, ethnicity, 
or gender does not exist. As noted earlier, there is an emerging international 
consensus that, in spite of the common assumption, taxation is far from neutral. In 
many ways, the international tax equity research supports the fundamental 
insights of critical tax theory, but it employs economic research, rather than 
critical theory to make its case. It uses country-specific methodologies that take 
into account the structure of the domestic tax system, as well as other institutional 
concerns.74 Its central conclusion is that policy makers “need to be mindful that 
tax policies do not place undue burdens on the poor or the marginalized.”75 In 
other words, policy makers must look through the false neutrality of taxation to 
see the actual taxpayers and determine who bears the burdens and who reaps the 
benefits. 
2. Equity and efficiency 
The overriding commitment to taxpayer neutrality within traditional U.S. 
tax policy is reinforced by the all-important guiding principles of equity and 
efficiency.76 Equity involves comparisons between and among taxpayers; whereas 
efficiency refers to the choices taxpayers make. In the personal income tax 
context, equity is usually expressed as two distinct yet related considerations: 
                                                 
72
 Id. PERAP suggested that “entire package of options selected should be evaluated by the 
Treasury or the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to see what impact it has on tax liability by 
income class.” Id. 
73
 Id. The Report concluded that  
If, as seems likely, the package raises taxes for some income groups and lowers 
them for others, this could be offset by adjustments to the standard deduction, 
tax rates or other provisions. Of course, even if the rates are adjusted to be 
revenue neutral in each income class, there will be individual taxpayers who 
gain and lose. We did not try to hold all taxpayers harmless in the options we 
evaluated, and we were not asked to do so by the President. It would be 
impossible to do so without substantial costs in terms of lost revenues. 
Id. 
74
 Grown and Valodia, supra note 23.  
75
 UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10, at 4. 
76
 The third principle is the ease of administration or simplicity. STEUERLE, supra note 17, at 10. 
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horizontal equity and vertical equity.77 Horizontal equity maintains that similarly 
situated taxpayers should be treated the same.78 Vertical equity recognizes that a 
progressive rate structure demands that higher income taxpayers pay a greater 
amount of tax, and it also recognizes that higher income taxpayers will (and 
should) be treated differently. 79  For purposes of both horizontal and vertical 
equity, difference/sameness is measured solely in terms of income level.80 
Of course, there is nothing inexorable about using income level as the 
primary distinguishing feature between and among taxpayers. The decision that 
income level is the only important distinguishing characteristic represents a 
normative choice that privileges economic production and masks other 
differences.81 As Tony Infanti has observed, the choice of income “sanitizes the 
debate over tax fairness—cleansing it of uncomfortable discussions of racism, 
sexism, heterosexism, and disability discrimination.” 82  Income level is also a 
relatively unstable characteristic because it is necessarily a product of the very 
system that it is then used to evaluate. Thus, questions of equity take on a very 
bounded nature because a tax system is considered equitable if it treats similarly 
situated taxpayers the same, but whether or not taxpayers are considered the 
“same” is a function of the tax law and how it chooses to measure income. 
 The goal of efficiency, sometimes referred to as tax neutrality, also 
reflects normative choices and embedded values that are by no means inexorable. 
Efficiency holds that a tax system should minimize tax distortions, 83  but it 
typically only seeks to measure these distortions with respect to market-based 
decision making. Accordingly, the concept of efficiency begs the questions of 
what constitutes a market-based decision, and where does one draw the line 
between personal decision making and economic decision making? 84 
                                                 
77




 Id at 11. Vertical equity could also address whether higher income taxpayers capture a 
disproportionate share of certain tax benefits.  
80
 See Seto and Buhai, supra note 29, at 1073–74 (asserting that traditional tax theory has “almost 
no capacity to deal with differences—other than differences of income—in taxpayers’ abilities to 
pay taxes”). 
81
 See Infanti, supra note 21, 1195 (“This represents a normative choice to consider economic 
differences—and only economic differences—in determining the fairness of a tax whose larger 
purpose is to allocate the burden of funding our government and of paying for public services.”).  
82
 Id. at 1209 (“By assuming a far more homogeneous population than the one that actually exists, 
horizontal and vertical equity screen from the tax policy debate many issues relating to race, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, and they tend to transmute any remaining 
issues into ones of economic class.”).  
83
 Tax expenditures and tax incentives violate this rule because they are designed to change 
taxpayer behavior. 
84
 Karen Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral: New Tax Treatment of Employment 
Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 223 (1998) (considering whether 
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 For example, the combination of the joint filing provisions and the 
progressive rate structure can produce a disincentive for married women to enter 
(or re-enter) the workforce due to the stacking effect.85 Does this disincentive 
raise an efficiency concern or is it merely a private non-market choice? 86 
Similarly, the federal estate tax provisions include an unlimited marital deduction 
for amounts payable to a surviving spouse, including amounts structured as a 
“qualified terminable interest property” (QTIP) that do not grant the surviving 
spouse substantial ownership rights.87 Some commentators have argued that these 
QTIP provisions encourage the higher wealth spouse not to leave his property 
outright to the surviving spouse but instead to leave the survivor a more limited 
interest in the property.88  Does the incentive provided by this tax-advantaged 
option raise efficiency concerns or does it merely reflect a personal estate 
planning decision?89 
C. Critical Tax Theory and Scholarship 
Critical tax theory emerged as a distinct area of scholarship almost two 
decades ago. 90 It has clear roots in the tradition of critical legal studies, 91 as well 
                                                                                                                                     
discrimination awards should be excluded from gross income as part of the cost of doing 
business).  
85
 Staudt, supra note 27 (discussing how the tax laws deter women from entering the paid labor 
market).  
86
 Smith v. Commission, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff’d, 113 F. 2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (denying the 
deductibility of child care costs as a business expense). 
87
 I.R.C. §2056(b)(7) (2006). 
88
 Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to 
Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 301 (1996). 
89
 Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital 
Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1734 (1998) (rejecting argument QTIP shows “respect” for 
“wives and widows”). 
90
 Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi (writing in 2009 that “[i]n the last fifteen years, there 
has emerged a small but steady stream of scholarship that . . . constitutes . . . ‘critical tax 
scholarship’”). Professor Grace Blumberg is widely considered to have written the first 
comprehensive outsider critique of the Tax Code in a 1971 law review article. Grace Blumberg, 
Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 
BUFF. L. REV. 48 (1971). See also Marjorie J. Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imaging 
the Income Tax, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 289, 325 (2002) (referring to Professor Blumberg as 
the “mother of this area”); Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1574 (calling her early article a “pioneering 
work of feminist tax analysis”).  
91
 Critical perspectives were fairly late to surface in the field of taxation. In contrast, the areas of 
criminal law, constitutional law, contracts, environmental law, and property law all had a rather 
robust output of critical scholarship starting in the late 1970s. See generally RICHARD W. 
BAUMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE (1996). Several reasons have 
been given for this late start, not the least of which is that scholars who were generally interested 
in issues of social justice were put off by the highly technical nature of tax and its apparent remove 
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as feminism and other methods of outsider scholarship, such as critical race 
studies and queer theory.92 Leveled largely as a critique of the existing U.S. tax 
structure, 93  critical tax theory has challenged the presumed objectivity and 
neutrality of a tax theory based primarily on economic modeling.94 It has also 
taken issue with many of the specific claims of neutrality discussed in the 
previous section. By challenging the objective neutrality of the tax code, critical 
tax theory attempts to look beyond the homogenizing effect of classification 
based on income, 95  and instead, it seeks to “put a face on America’s tax 
returns.”96 Central to this undertaking is the recognition that “tax is political”97 
and not merely a set of abstract economic principals.98 
                                                                                                                                     
from daily matters. Crawford and Infanti, supra note 35, at xxii. Tax scholars, on the other hand, 
were typically not trained in critical analysis, but favored economic analysis as the preferred lens 
through which to evaluate tax law and policy. It took a new generation of tax scholars to apply the 
lessons of critical theory to the byzantine world of taxation.  
92
 Although it is difficult to categorize the divergent voices of the critical tax scholars, they all 
share a common understanding that “legal doctrine and legal institutions are contingent products 
in an evolutionary process of social change.” BAUMAN, supra note 91, at 29. Speaking of the 
larger field of critical studies, Bauman also remarks on the difficulty of categorization given the 
“heterogeneity of the movement.” Id. at 3. In this way, the critical tax scholars can trace their roots 
directly to the larger and earlier field of critical legal studies that rejects law’s neutrality and the 
existence of determinative rules that produce objective and predictable adjudications. Id. at 33. 
93
 Critical tax scholarship focuses primarily on the federal personal income tax, although some 
commentators have discussed the estate and gift tax, as well as the rules governing retirement 
accounts and social security payroll taxes. See generally, Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk 
Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity, and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 385 (2007) (addressing pensions); Staudt, supra note 27 (addressing social security wages). 
 
94
 Taking issue with a leading critic of critical tax theory on the question of objectivity, Marjorie 
Kornhauser wrote: 
[The critic’s] vision of detached and disinterested may be the empirical study 
with its scientific approach, because science is frequently viewed as the ultimate 
representative of Objective Truth in our culture . . . . To use only science, or 
some other “detached and disinterested” technique, is to silence other 
viewpoints behind a mask of unanimity and objectiveness. Not only is this 
oppressive, but it denies everybody of the insights, knowledge, and possible 
solutions that the alternative communities can provide. 
Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1623-26. 
95
 See Infanti, supra note 21, at 1206 (noting the “homogenizing effect”). 
96





 Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi. See Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1627 (“In the tax 
world, this approach means that we must constantly be aware that the tax laws reflect social and 
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Following the lead of critical legal studies, critical tax scholarship has 
recognized the law as a complex social, political, and economic process—an act 
of social construction that has unique constitutive powers.99 To put this insight in 
a tax context, one of the most long-standing topics of tax scholarship has been the 
quest for the ideal tax base.100 According to a critical perspective, however, the 
tax base does not exist a priori. It cannot precede the law but rather, is a creation 
of the law. When the tax law defines the tax base, it also constitutes the base. In 
this way, society would not be said to choose an optimal tax base. Society 
constitutes a tax base through the process of legislation, regulation, judicial 
interpretation, compliance, and enforcement. 101 
In rejecting blanket claims of neutrality, critical tax scholars have focused 
instead on exploring the role tax laws play in the construction of social meaning 
and exposing explicit and implicit bias in the tax code.102 Critical tax scholars 
have also stressed the connection between taxation and broader questions of 
social justice and progressive causes. 103  These scholars have taken a special 
                                                                                                                                     
political choices, not just economic ones, and that all these choices have different impacts on 
different groups.”).  
98
 Marjorie Kornhauser explains that “economic analysis has had a long tradition of obscuring the 
normative underpinnings of economic theories of tax.” Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of 
the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 486 
(1987).  
99
 It is a complex social, political, and economic process. It is a social construction that has unique 
constitutive power due to many factors, not the least of which is that law exists as the command of 
the sovereign. Critical legal theory views the deployment of law as the exercise of constitutive 
power such that “all legal reasoning involves the creation of meaning rather than the discovery of 
meanings already present in such materials.” BAUMAN, supra note 91, at 33. Critical legal theory 
openly challenged the once majestic notion that the rule of law existed as an autonomous entity, 
separate from those who create it, interpret it, and are subject to it. 
100
 The theory of optimal tax policy was developed by economist James Mirrlees for the purpose 
of determining how progressive an income tax should be if the system’s goal is maximization of 
welfare. See Mirrlees, supra note 22. 
101
 From a critical point of view, any claim of tax exceptionalism—the notion that tax law is 
different from general law must be attributed to (or illustrated by) something other than the 
inherent nature of tax law. See Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truths, 23 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2010) (responding to claims of tax exceptionalism resulting from the “inherent 
fictions in tax law”). 
102
 See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the 
Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV 1 (1994) (discussing the 
role of the corporate charitable contribution deduction and the marketing advantage of the “halo 
effect”). 
103
 Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi (noting that critical tax theory seeks “to educate 
nontax scholars and lawyers about the interconnectedness of taxation, social justice, and 
progressive social movements”). See also Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1609. (explaining that 
“taxes also tell us more generally about our society since what we tax and how we tax reflect a 
multitude of philosophical, social, and political choices”). 
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interest in the numerous ways tax laws impact “traditionally disempowered 
groups such as people of color; women of all colors; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender people; low-income and poor individuals; the disabled; and 
nontraditional families.” 104  To this end, they have spent considerable time 
discussing the more obviously gendered or otherwise exclusionary provisions of 
the tax code such as the marital provisions,105 as well as the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the joint filing provisions.106 Critical tax scholars have also revealed 
implicit bias by re-examining such seemingly neutral and arcane provisions as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) paid to the working poor, 107  the marital 
deduction QTIP under the federal estate and gift tax, 108  employer-provided 
pension plans,109 and the so-called “Nanny Tax.”110 In each instance, critical tax 
theorists have endeavored to illustrate how existing tax law and policy can 
“reflect and even reify discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, 
class, disability or family structure.”111 
The efforts of critical tax scholars to bring an outsider perspective to tax 
policy and question the base premise of taxpayer neutrality have often been met 
with stiff and sustained resistance from mainstream tax scholars who write 
primarily from an economics or public welfare perspective.112 As a result, critical 
                                                 
104
 Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi.  
105
 See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender 
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993). See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, 
and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 63 
(1993) (critiquing the income pooling rationale of the joint filing provisions). 
106
 Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998).  
The exclusion of same-sex couples from the marital provisions is intentional. As 
a result, there is nothing hidden or covert about the heterosexist bias of the tax 
code. There is no neutral principle at work. The rationale for the exclusion is not 
that same-sex couples do not pool their resources like opposite-sex married 
couples. Instead, the rationale for the exclusion is based on the beliefs that a 
same-sex couple is not a family, that no civilized society has ever countenanced 
such unions, and that our Judeo-Christian heritage forbids them.  
Id. at 233. 
107
 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 
(2007). 
108
 See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading 
to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 301 (1996). 
109
 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity, 
and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 385 (2007).  
110
 See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward a Global Critical Feminist Vision: Domestic Work and 
the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 (1999). 
111
 Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi. 
112
 By 1998, critical tax writings had attracted sufficient attention that the North Carolina Law 
Review dedicated a Symposium issue to critical tax theory—or more accurately, to a critique of 
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tax theory has remained essentially a critique—a view from the margin that can 
both inform and illuminate—but it has failed to find a wide audience among tax 
scholars or application for its insights within tax policy. 113  From the outset, 
critical tax scholarship was derided by mainstream tax scholars for being trendy, 
divisive, and less than rigorous.114 Its authors were accused of selection bias115 
and spreading conspiracy theories. 116  They were faulted for trying to find 
                                                                                                                                     
critical tax theory. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 32; Dodge, supra note 32. The Symposium issues 
also included works by critical tax scholars, many of whom expressed surprise that their work was 
met with such resistance given that the observations of critical tax theory seemed “obvious.” 
Beverly Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can We Ever Know Anything About Race and Tax?, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1629 (1998).  
The thing that is the most surprising about this entire Symposium is that there is 
a symposium at all. Many of the matters discussed in A Black Critique of the 
Internal Revenue Code and the other articles highlighted here are obvious. Our 
tax system does more than tax revenues. It also tries to shape, punish, and 
reward behaviors. The Code is subject to influence. Blacks and whites know 
very little about one another, and whites essentially hold the power to tax. What 
would make any one of us think that the Code would not have rules that favored 
whites over blacks? 
Id. at 1637. 
113
 See Michael A. Livingston, Women, Poverty, and the Tax Code: A Tale of Theory and 
Practice, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 327, 330 (2002). Livingston explains, “Although many tax 
scholars are more sympathetic, the largest numbers have simply ignored the critical tax endeavor, 
leaving women’s and minorities’ concerns somewhat peripheral to the broader tax subject.” Id.  
114
 See Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1753, 
1770 (1998). Jensen argues that tax academics should be able to “evaluate the merits of legal 
policy without using trendy (and divisive) language, conspiratorial theories, otherworldly 
standards[.]” Id.  
115
 See Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1578 (asserting that “problems of one-sidedness and incomplete 




 See Dodge, supra note 32, at 1729 (noting that he had “some bones to pick with feminist 
scholarship in this area, namely, its innuendos of a male chauvinist plot”). See also Knauer, supra 
28, at 234 n. 517.  
The recent commentary on critical tax scholarship has pointed disapprovingly to 
a conspiracy stance, despite attempts to explain that no one thinks that the 
members of Congress are staying up at night trying to devise ways to increase 
the incidence of taxation on African Americans. In many ways, of course, the 
systemic racism that can lead to the unremarkable nature of the provisions 
outlined by Moran and Whitford is even more insidious and more difficult to 
address than vocal racism.  
Id. 
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“hidden” discrimination. 117  In many instances, the opponents seemed to be 
completely flummoxed by the clear lack of solutions offered by the critical tax 
theorists.118 Some appeared vaguely insulted by the assertion that tax law would 
necessarily reflect existing biases and existing inequities because in the 
opponents’ view, tax law was no different from any other type of law. 119 In many 
circles, critical tax scholarship was dismissed as “mere critique,” 120  and its 
resulting policy interventions were labeled as “troubling” or “underdeveloped”—
or in some instances even “dangerous.”121  
Much of the criticism directed at critical tax scholarship came from an 
identity-blind position under which race, gender, and other identity characteristics 
have no place in tax policy.122 Under an identity-blind paradigm, any suggestion 
that tax policy should examine its impact on specific groups was criticized as an 
                                                 
117
 Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1579 (reporting “the impression the authors set out on the sort of 
search for hidden discrimination”). On the topic of “hidden discrimination,” Zelenak charged: 
“[w]ithin the critical tax movement, there is a reward for examining a tax provision and finding it 
guilty of hidden discrimination; there is no reward for discovering a provision is innocent.” Id. at 
1578. For a response to this point, see Leo P. Martinez and Jennifer M. Martinez, The Internal 
Revenue Code and Latino Realities: A Critical Perspective, 22 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 
387 (2011) (noting that “we persist in believing that highlighting racial inequities in the Code is a 
useful task because exposing racial inequalities is the best avenue for promoting discourse with 
respect to whether such inequalities can in fact be justified.”). 
118
 Marjorie Kornhauser responded directly to this criticism, noting: 
[A]ll scholarship need not (and does not) produce solutions. Before a solution 
can be found, a problem must be identified. Critical tax theory, like other 
outsider theory, is especially good at identifying problems. A better solution 
may not be possible; sometimes there is no way to solve one problem without 
creating another. Yet critical tax theory’s different perspective is still useful . . . . 
It will remind us, as we must be reminded, that our solutions are partial and 
evolving. 
Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1626-27. 
119
 See Erik M. Jensen, supra note 114, at 1762 (“If racial subordination is really so pervasive that 
it exists even when legislators are drafting facially neutral tax statutes, with the best of intentions, 
what in the world are people of good will to do? Indeed, can there be any people of good will?”). 
120
 Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1524 (arguing that “mere critique without a workable solution does 
nothing to better anyone's situation”). For a response see Nancy C. Staudt, Tax Theory And "Mere 
Critique": A Reply To Professor Zelenak, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (1998) (referring to the 
“single-minded focus on solutions” as “both ironic and bizarre”). 
121
 Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1532; 1560; 1571. See also id. at 1540 (stating that “an explicitly 
sex-based system can only be a disaster . . . remarkable for its capacity to offend almost 
everyone”).  
122
 See Galvin, supra note 67, at 1749. Galvin argued that “A tax system should be neutral in its 
effect on each citizen’s decisionmaking. Therefore, assuming a democratic ideal of a free society 
with equal opportunity for all, the framers of tax policy should strive for a system that is blind as 
to gender and color.” Id. 
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inappropriate form of special pleading that was directly contrary to the principle 
of equity.123 Mainstream tax scholars warned that attempts to correct for implicit 
bias in the tax code would give rise to a “nightmare of dilemmas” and produce 
considerable discontent among taxpayers and policy makers. 124 
When mainstream tax scholars engaged critical tax scholars on the merits, it 
was mostly on the question of numbers. Mainstream tax scholars argued that 
critical tax scholars had not proven that tax laws have a disparate impact on 
marginalized groups, especially when viewed within the larger progressive rate 
structure,125 or when taking into account other entitlement programs. They also 
claimed that the continuing progressivity of the tax code evidenced an overriding 
intent, as a matter of public policy, to benefit low-income taxpayers rather than to 
penalize disadvantaged groups.126 Accordingly, mainstream tax scholars argued 
that any claims of bias were necessarily misplaced because the income tax, by its 
very nature, served a broader redistributive goal.127 
Despite this inauspicious reception, many of the insights of critical tax 
theory now find support in international practices such as gender mainstreaming 
and gender-sensitive budgeting.128 Moreover, the prime assertion of critical tax 
theorists that tax is political has received widespread national attention in 
connection with United States v. Windsor, the groundbreaking U.S. Supreme 
Court case that challenged the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act 
                                                 
123
 See Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1540 (asserting that “an explicitly sex-based system can only be 
a disaster.”).  
124
 Galvin, supra note 67, at 1749 (“I agree with Professor Zelenak that any attempt to tailor the 
system to meet the criticisms of feminists or racial groups rapidly becomes a nightmare of 
dilemmas that are just not resolvable”). According to Galvin, “One needs only to observe 
lifestyles of friends, colleagues, neighbors, and relatives, and one becomes keenly aware that to 
design a tax regime to meet the gender and race considerations of each case would create a 
statutory maze of confusion many times worse confounded than the current system.” Id. 
125
 See, e.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 36, at 1834.  
126
 Id. (“[T]he tax is progressive, which must greatly favor African-Americans in light of their 
significantly lower average incomes . . . the progressivity of the tax system is a far more important 
characteristic from an African-American viewpoint than are any of the characteristics Moran and 
Whitford consider in their article.”). 
127
 See, e.g., James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Critics, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1687 
(1998) (expressing incredulity at the attacks by women and African-Americans on the income tax, 




 See generally UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10 (describing the relationship between gender 
and taxation as a method to combat poverty). In addition, Cambridge University Press released a 
comprehensive reader in critical tax theory in 2009 that recognizes the field as a “distinct mode of 
inquiry.” INFANTI & CRAWFORD, supra note 35, at xxi. Critical tax theorists have also forged 
connections with kindred spirits writing in other more progressive fields, such as law & sexuality 
and family law. 
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(DOMA).129 As it turns out, one of the most important civil rights cases of this 
generation was a tax case involving the exclusion of same-sex married couples 
from the marital deduction provisions under the federal estate tax.130 
II. CHOOSING A CRITICAL LENS 
This section focuses on the choice and construction of a critical lens that 
will enable policy makers to identify explicit and implicit bias within the tax 
system, as well as inform how they exercise their discretion. As discussed in the 
previous section, existing bias is often obscured by the misplaced belief in the 
inherent neutrality of taxation. Thus, the first step in developing a critical lens is 
to reject tax exceptionalism and recognize that sometimes it is necessary to go in 
search of hidden bias in order to promote equity. Although consistent with the 
recommendations of critical tax theory, this intuition regarding hidden bias is also 
supported by an emerging international tax equity consensus that acknowledges 
the important role taxation can play in re-enforcing existing disparities and 
persistent inequality.131 
The international consensus is primarily directed at questions of gender 
equity. However, it is possible to imagine similar inquiries proceeding along any 
number of identity axes, depending on the points of difference or inequality 
deemed significant within a given country.132 Accordingly, the second step in 
developing a critical lens is identifying which significant differences or inequities 
policy makers should consider, while simultaneously recognizing that they will 
necessarily evolve and change over time. This section first discusses how to make 
that determination. It then applies the critical lens to three instances of bias in the 
tax code: one explicit, one implicit, and one resulting from an exercise of 
interpretive discretion. In each case, the critical lens offers a mode of analysis that 
challenges the myth of taxpayer neutrality, but it does not prescribe a specific 
legislative or regulatory safeguard. The third and final step in developing a critical 
lens is to create an enforcement mechanism. Part III proposes a potential range of 
safeguards and auditing procedures that all draw on accepted institutional 
                                                 
129
 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
130
 See Adam Liptak & Peter Baker, Justices Cast Doubt on Benefits Ban in U.S. Marriage Law, 
N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 27, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/us/supreme-court-defense-of-
marriage-act.html. 
131
 See generally UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10 (describing the relationship between gender 
and taxation as a method to combat poverty). 
132
 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a 
Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (2009) (proposing a method to identify 
society groups singled out for consideration). In connection with her proposal for a legislative 
impact statement, Anita Krishnakumar sets forth a detailed procedure to identify a “red flag list” 
of identity groups or characteristics. Id. at 27–29. She advocates the creation of a non-partisan 
committee to select and periodically review the groups. Id. at 28–29.  
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traditions and constraints: enhanced data collection, the creation of a diversity 
expenditure budget, and the requirement that all major tax measures must be 
accompanied by a diversity impact statement. 
A. Identifying the Axes of Difference. 
A core value of critical tax policy is the understanding that taxation is not 
neutral. To the contrary, it often involves clear “winners and losers” that are 
obscured by the construct of taxpayer neutrality—the assumption that the only 
meaningful distinction among taxpayers is income level. 133  International 
economists have shown numerous ways that taxation can interact with gender 
norms and patterns of subordination to skew the incidence of taxation along 
identity groups and thereby reinforce existing inequalities.134 Critical tax policy 
urges policy makers to acknowledge and address the connection between taxation 
and inequality by examining taxation through a critical lens, one which 
foregrounds relevant identity characteristics and prompts policy makers to ask 
difficult questions. By viewing taxation through this critical lens, policy makers 
would be better able to evaluate the impact of a given tax structure on social 
inequalities and determine what, if any, remedial measures would be are 
necessary or desirable. Therefore, a critical lens makes taxpayer differences 
visible and holds policy makers accountable for their choices.135 
Although the majority of the international tax equity research has focused 
on gender, there are numerous other identity characteristics or points of difference 
that could also be relevant when evaluating tax policy for bias. Critical tax 
theorists, writing from the vantage point of critical race studies, LatCrit, feminist 
legal theory, disability studies, or queer theory, have explored many of these 
characteristics and raised questions related to race, ethnicity, gender, disability, 
sexual orientation, and gender identity.136 In an effort to illustrate the prevalence 
of implicit bias in the tax code, several critical tax theorists have used the 
heuristic of an ideal legislature comprised entirely of outsiders.137 They argued 
                                                 
133
 See  PERAP TAX REPORT , supra note 4.  
134
 See generally MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 1 (“There is a view that to deploy tax law for any 
instrumental purpose somehow detracts from its purity and causes it to function less well as a 
system of tax”). Mumford explains that “[t]he project of this book is to argue . . . that the tax 
system should be deployed to militate against economic discrimination against women.” Id. 
135
 The adoption of a critical lens, therefore, also advances the interests of transparency and better 
budgeting advocated by the tax expenditure concept. See SCHWABISH & GRIFFITH, supra note 55 
(describing transparency gains). 
136
 See generally CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 11 (an anthology with 
over fifty articles either written from a critical tax perspective or responding to it).  
137
 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 294–97 (imaging a tax system designed and 
implemented by women following an “ethic of care”); Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 780-
81 (describing a “Black Congress” and the tax changes it might recommend).  
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that a “Black Congress” or a “legislator named Sue” would reflexively adopt a 
critical lens when approaching issues of public policy and taxation.138 Although 
this might be true, the question remains: What should be done in the case of a less 
than ideal decision maker who does not come hardwired with a critical lens? 
In the absence of an intuitive appreciation for the salience of difference, a 
critical lens provides policy makers a prompt to consider distributional issues 
across identity groups and consider identity characteristics that may be relevant 
for tax policy purposes. This section is concerned mainly with the construction of 
the lens, and Part III of this Article discusses various enforcement procedures and 
safeguards to aid in the implementation of the critical lens. The adoption of a 
critical lens will make certain taxpayer characteristics visible that were 
intentionally obscured under the myth of taxpayer neutrality. Instead of simply 
viewing taxpayers in income bands, a critical lens allows policy makers to 
evaluate the actual incidence of tax broken down by membership in a particular 
identity group. 
Consistent with current federal policy, a critical lens for tax policy would 
most likely include race, gender, and perhaps ethnicity and disability.139 In the 
United States, there is wide agreement that the identity characteristics of race and 
gender continue to carry significant social meaning that is weighted with 
discrimination and bias.140 Federal, state, and local policies include robust anti-
discrimination protections for race and gender; although, stronger protections 
remain in place for race. 141  Federal policies also extend anti-discrimination 
protections based on disability and age.142 
With respect to other points of difference, such as sexual orientation or 
gender identity, there are varying degrees of agreement at the federal level and 
                                                 
138
 See Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 752 (noting that “it is likely that blacks rarely used 
income averaging.”) Id. For example, Moran and Whitford note that “it is likely that blacks rarely 
used income averaging.” Moran and Whitford, supra note 26, at 752. They reason that a “Black 
Congress” would not bother to enact pro-taxpayer income averaging because a “Congress oriented 
solely to the interests of blacks would never have perceived the original wrong that income 
averaging was intended to cure.” Id. at 752–53. 
139
 For a discussion of the federal government and demographic data collection based on identity 
group or characteristics, see infra text accompanying notes 221- 32. 
140
 See, e.g., Title VII, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000 (2012) (extending 
protection in employment based on race and sex). 
141
 For example, classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny for equal protection 
purposes, whereas classifications based on gender receive only heightened scrutiny. 
142
 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (extending 
federal anti-discrimination protections based on disability); The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012) (extending anti-discrimination in employment 
on account of age). 
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considerable variation among the states.143 Federal policy has not wholeheartedly 
endorsed equal rights for individuals regardless of sexual orientation or gender 
identity, although public support on both counts has increased significantly over 
the last several years.144 As a result, sexual orientation and gender identity may 
represent two points of difference that would be included looking forward. It is 
also possible that there might be other groups who would warrant special attention 
in terms of tax policy, such as veterans. 145 
Once the critical lens is calibrated to capture the points of difference 
deemed relevant to tax policy, it remains to be seen how it should be imposed. 
Part III discusses three enforcement measures that would require legislative or 
executive action. However, it is also possible to urge individual decision makers 
to adopt a critical lens and invite them to look beyond the myth of taxpayer 
neutrality. Legislators could then take this perspective with them into 
deliberations, and agency officials could draw on it when issuing guidance. At its 
most basic, a critical lens prescribes an appreciation for difference and the 
continuing disparities that exist in terms of access to and participation in various 
social, political, and economic benefits and activities. On an individual level, a 
critical lens requires a degree of cultural competence and diversity awareness.146 
                                                 
143
 Currently, federal protections do not exist in employment, housing, or public accommodations 
on account of sexual orientation or gender identity. At the state level, there are seventeen states 
and the District of Columbia that prohibit discrimination in employment based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity. Four additional states prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, but not gender identity. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS 
& POLICIES, July 22, 2013, available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Employment_ 
Laws_and_Policies.pdf.  
144
 Peter Baker, Same-Sex Marriage Support Shows Pace of Social Change Accelerating, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 12, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/us/same-sex-marriage-support-shows-
pace-of-social-change-accelerating.html?_r=0 (noting “the dizzying pace of social change”). 
145
 For example, veterans who are disabled or who serve on active duty during certain specified 
times are entitled to hiring preferences for federal employment. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (2012). See 
also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, VETERANS’ PREFERENCE OPERATIONS MANUAL (Apr. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/vms/Volume%20XII/vp_ops_manual.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013). 
146
 The Office of Minority Health, Department of Health and Human Services, uses the following 
definition of “cultural competency”: 
Cultural and linguistic competence is a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and 
policies that come together in a system, agency, or among professionals that 
enables effective work in cross-cultural situations. ‘Culture’ refers to integrated 
patterns of human behavior that include the language, thoughts, 
communications, actions, customs, beliefs, values, and institutions of racial, 
ethnic, religious, or social groups. ‘Competence’ implies having the capacity to 
function effectively as an individual and an organization within the context of 
the cultural beliefs, behaviors, and needs presented by consumers and their 
communities. 
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Although cultural competency is a widely accepted professional norm in the fields 
of health care, social work, education, and human relations, 147 it has found little 
application beyond these largely service-oriented fields.148 Perhaps it is time to 
urge our policy makers to evidence that same appreciation for difference and 
ability to interact with individuals from diverse backgrounds that we expect from 
our doctors, nurses, teachers, and HR directors. 
Of course, some people will object to the idea of imposing a critical lens as 
identity politics run amuck. For conservatives who oppose affirmative action and 
support “racial privacy” laws, any attempt to analyze tax expenditures based on 
race will look suspiciously like racial favoritism and the institutionalization of 
entitlements.149 From a quite different point on the political spectrum, there are 
others who might object on the grounds that the critical lens represents a step 
backward at a time when we should be moving toward a public policy that 
embraces post-identity politics.150 For the post-identity critic, the goal of public 
policy should be to dismantle identity—not to introduce it into an area that 
traditionally has been identity-free. Addressing this second point, it is important 
to note that the proposal for a critical lens is not incompatible with aspirations for 
a post-identity society. The critical lens recognizes that identity is a social 
construction but also argues that in certain circumstances public policy should 
continue to take these identity classifications into account. Where difference 
remains marked by inequality, efforts to ignore the difference will simply leave 
inequality. 
B. Explicit and Implicit Bias in the Personal Income Tax 
Any tax system can contain instances of both explicit and implicit bias. 
Explicit bias should be easier to see because it refers to a tax provision that is 
                                                                                                                                     
What Is Cultural Competency?, THE OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, available at 
http://minorityhealth.hhs. gov/templates/browse.aspx?lvl=2&lvlID=11 (last visited Apr. 
4, 2013) (internal citations omitted). 
147
 See, e.g., MARYANNE R. JEFFREYS, TEACHING CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN NURSING AND 
HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 2010) (nursing); CULTURALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
UNDERSTANDING DIVERSE GROUPS AND JUSTICE ISSUES (Doman Lum, ed., 4th ed. 2011) (social 
work); JEAN MOULE, CULTURAL COMPETENCE: A PRIMER FOR EDUCATORS (2d ed. 2012) 
(education). 
148
 See, e.g., MARYANNE R. JEFFREYS, TEACHING CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN NURSING AND 
HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 2010) (nursing); DOMAN LUM, CULTURALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING DIVERSE GROUPS AND JUSTICE ISSUES (Doman Lum, ed., 4th 
ed. 2011) (social work); JEAN MOULE, CULTURAL COMPETENCE: A PRIMER FOR EDUCATORS (2d 
ed. 2012) (education). 
149
 For a discussion of the “racial privacy” movement see infra text accompanying notes 242-48.  
150
 For a discussion of the multi-racial movement and the post-identity perspective see infra text 
accompanying notes 232-44.  
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outright discriminatory or exclusionary on its face. For example, in Morocco, 
married taxpayers file individually, but all dependent allowances for children are 
allocated to the husband, thereby reducing his effective rate of tax and denying 
the wife the deduction.151 This practice represents an explicit preference based on 
gender. When explicit bias is based on deeply embedded practices, however, it 
may be difficult to recognize because it reflects an affirmative policy choice—it is 
intentional. 152  In other words, a policymaker using a critical lens to identify 
gender bias within a tax code may not find the fact that marital filing provisions 
exclude same-sex partners to be remarkable because until recently the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage was taken as a given.153  
 
As its name implies, implicit bias is not evident on the face of the tax 
code.154 The myth of taxpayer neutrality makes it impossible for policy makers to 
evaluate the incidence of taxation along identity group lines. Accordingly, tax 
policy can lead to unintended consequences where the tax code ends up 
reinforcing existing disparities or creating undesirable incentives. These 
unintended consequences would qualify as implicit bias—the natural result of a 
system where “tax legislation intersects with . . . relationships, norms, and 
economic behavior.”155 An example of implicit gender bias would be where a tax 
code privileges a certain type of economic behavior that is more often associated 
with men.156 
The critical lens adopted by policy makers should be sensitive to both 
implicit and explicit bias, as well as instances where a discretionary interpretation 
might reinforce or reflect existing inequalities. The three following examples deal 
with each of these instances individually: explicit bias, implicit bias, and 
discretionary bias. Each case involves either sexual orientation or gender identity, 
recognizing that both identity characteristics are presently outside the traditional 
groups recognized in federal policy. 
                                                 
151
 See UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10, at 6. This is the default rule. Id. The wife may claim the 
allowances if she can show that her husband and children are dependent on her earnings. Id.  
152
 The marital provisions and same-sex couples represents a clear example of intentional 
exclusion in US tax policy. See Knauer, supra note 28, at 233.  
153
 This is an example of heteronormativity. Id. at 133 (defining heteronomativity as “the largely 
unstated assumption that heterosexuality is the essential and elemental ordering principal of 
society”). See also Chrys Ingraham, The Heterosexual Imaginary: Feminist Sociology and 
Theories of Gender, in QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY 169 (Steven Seidman ed., 1996) (defining 
heteronormativity as “the view that institutionalized heterosexuality constitutes the standard for 
legitimate and prescriptive sociosexual arrangements”). 
154
 See MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 3 (cautioning that the question of implicit bias “necessarily 
involve subjective judgments about appropriate economic behaviour”). 
155
 UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10, at 4. 
156
 Id. 
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1. Explicit bias – the marital filing provisions 
Anyone looking for explicit bias in the tax code directed toward LGBT 
taxpayers need go no farther than Section 1 where the tax tables establish a 
different and, in many instances, more favorable rate structure for married 
taxpayers.157 The struggle for marriage equality in the United States has largely 
proceeded on a state-by-state basis.158 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia 
currently recognize same-sex marriage.159 An additional seven states extend all 
the equivalent rights and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples but call the 
resulting status by another name, such as civil union or domestic partnership.160 
Despite these gains, the vast majority of states continue to have laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.161 
Until recently, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) mandated that for all 
federal purposes marriage was restricted to “a union between one man and one 
woman.” 162  As a result, a same-sex couple who was married and lived in a 
                                                 
157
 IRC § 1(a);(c). 
158
 Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec. 
10, 2012), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited 
July 25, 2013). 
159
 In addition to the District of Columbia, the thirteen states are: California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, 
Vermont, and Washington. Id. 
160
 The seven states with a status equivalent to marriage are: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, New 
Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Id. 
161
 Thirty-one states have laws prohibiting marriage equality or have amended their state 
constitutions to prohibit marriage equality. Some states have both statutory and constitutional 
prohibitions. Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws , HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, available at 
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/ resources/marriage-
prohibitions_6-10-2014.pdf. The following twenty-eight states have constitutional amendments 
prohibiting marriage equality: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. Nineteen of these states have very aggressive 
anti-marriage laws that ban not only marriage equality, but also the grant of any of the so-called 
“incidents of marriage.” Id. The states with these “super DOMAs” are: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. In addition to 
the twenty-nine states with constitutional amendments, the following six states prohibit same-sex 
marriage by statue: Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id.  
162
 Enacted in 1996, DOMA provides that for all federal purposes marriage is only between one 
man and one woman. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), 
codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7.  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
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jurisdiction that recognized same-sex marriage was nonetheless considered 
“unmarried” for federal tax purposes.163 The 2013 United States Supreme Court 
case, U.S. v. Windsor, successfully challenged the section of DOMA that defined 
marriage at the federal level.164 The case involved a surviving spouse who was 
required to pay $363,000 in additional estate tax on the death of her spouse 
because their marriage was not recognized for federal tax purposes, even though it 
was recognized by their state of domicile.165 As noted earlier, the widespread 
public interest surrounding the Windsor case illustrates a core intuition of critical 
tax policy, namely that “tax is political.”166  
As long as DOMA was in force, the married same-sex couples who lived in 
the jurisdictions that recognize marriage equality were not considered married for 
federal tax purposes.167However, even after the definitional section of DOMA 
was declared unconstitutional, it remained unclear whether married same-sex 
taxpayers who reside in the non-marriage states would be considered married 
under the traditional domicile rule that pre-dated DOMA. 168  Under that rule, 
                                                                                                                                     
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 
Id. 
163
 The income tax rates are married, head of household, unmarried, and married filing separately. 
IRC § 1 (a)-(d). 
164
 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013). U.S. v. Windsor only challenged 
section 3 of DOMA, which provides the definitional section quoted above. Defense of Marriage 
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7. Section 2 of DOMA purports to allow states to refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in sister states. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738C. 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other 




 Edith Windsor married her long-time partner, Thea Spyer in Canada in 2007. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2689. At the time of Thea’s death in 2009, the couple lived in New York, and New York 




 See Kornhauser, supra note 65 (discussing the assertion that “tax is political”).  
168
 See Estate of Steffke v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 538 F.2d 730, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied sub nom. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 429 U.S. 1022 
(1976) (decedent’s spouse remained married to her first husband as a result of an invalid Mexican 
divorce); see also Estate of Goldwater v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 
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taxpayers are considered married for federal tax purposes if they are legally 
married in their state of domicile.169 Ultimately, the Internal Revenue Service 
declined to follow the more narrow “state of domicile” rule in favor of a more 
expansive “state of celebration” rule, which recognizes all legally married same-
sex couples.170 
Since Windsor, the Internal Revenue Service has also taken the position that 
same-sex couples who have entered into equivalent status relationships, such as 
civil unions or domestic partnerships, are not considered married for federal tax 
purposes nor are the same-sex couples who live in non-recognition states and 
cannot travel to marry in another state. 171  Accordingly, despite the favorable 
result in Windsor, the marital provisions in the federal tax code will likely 
continue to exclude some same-sex couples until all states recognize same-sex 
marriage.172 
The absence of formal equality for same-sex couples under the tax code has 
been a frequent topic in critical tax scholarship.173 It has also served as a point of 
departure for larger discussions involving the marital provisions that run 
throughout both the income tax and the estate and gift tax. When viewed in their 
totality, the marital provisions can be somewhat confusing, especially when 
attempting to measure their impact on the income tax liability of same-sex 
couples. The reason for the confusion is that the marital provisions do not 
necessarily produce a net benefit for all married couples.174 With respect to the 
                                                                                                                                     
1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lipkowitz v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976) 
(decedent remained married to first spouse because Mexican divorce was invalid). 
169
 IRC §7703(a)(1). With respect to marriage, the IRC provides rules regarding the timing of 
marriage but not regarding the substantive question of when a marriage is valid. An individual is 
considered married during a given tax year provided the individual is married on the last day of 
the taxable year. Id. 
170
 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-13-17.pdf (last visited Sept. 
11, 2013). 
171
 Id. In addition, some states, such as Wisconsin, prohibit couples from going out of state to 
secure a marriage that would violate the laws of their domicile. 12 WISC. STAT. § 765.04 (2013). 
In Wisconsin, the marriage is void and the couple is subject to criminal prosecution, with penalties 
of a fine up to $10,000 and up to nine months in prison. 12 WISC. STAT. § 765.30 (2013).  
172
 The Windsor case did not mandate same-sex marriage nation-wide. It only challenged the 
constitutionality of DOMA. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). The case that 
had the potential to mandate same-sex marriage nationwide was Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013). 
173
 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Domestic Partner Benefits, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 481 
(2010); Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2004); Patricia A. 
Cain, Federal Tax Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 387 (2002); Patricia A. Cain, 
Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677 (2000); Patricia A. Cain, 
Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 471 (1997). 
174
 Knauer, supra note 28, at 133-34. 
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personal income tax, the effect of the married-filing-jointly rate schedule on a 
couple’s income tax liability before and after marriage will depend on the 
distribution of earnings within the couple.175 If both partners are relatively equal 
earners, then the couple might actually experience a net increase in their tax 
liability when they marry.176 This effect is the so-called “marriage penalty.”177 On 
the other hand, if the partners earn disparate amounts, they will likely receive a 
“marriage bonus” when they marry.178 
Given that it is not always clear when the tax code will benefit marriage or 
when it will penalize marriage, many mainstream tax scholars openly dismissed 
the work of the critical tax scholars who were writing in this area because they 
could not definitively demonstrate that same-sex couples would be better off 
financially under a joint filing regime. 179  These objections reveal a telling 
disconnect between the two groups. Whereas the mainstream tax scholars 
interpret being “better off” as necessarily paying less tax, the critical tax scholars 
were more concerned with questions of formal equality. They advocated for the 
inclusion of same-sex couples in the marital provisions—for better or worse.180 
                                                                                                                                     
Not all couples see their federal income tax liability increase upon marriage. In 
fact, many more see it decrease, experiencing a marriage tax bonus. When 
viewed in their entirety, the seemingly discordant rules offer a composite picture 
of marriage. The rules reflect, for better or worse, a view of marriage as an 
economic unit, a fundamental unit of society, and an intimate association whose 
members may not deal with each other at arm’s length. 
Id. 
175
 MCCAFFERY, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the importance of the distribution of earnings 
within a couple).  
176
 Id. at 17 (describing the extent of the “marriage bonus”). 
177
 Id. at 19 (explaining that the “marriage penalty” is really a “secondary-earner penalty”). 
178
 Id. at 16 (referring to these couples as the “Traditionals”). 
179
 For example, Steve Johnson argued that tax scholarship addressing same-sex couples should 
not advance proposals for reform until it “convincingly demonstrates that, on net, the failure to 
recognize same-sex couples as married hurts them by imposing substantially higher federal 
income tax liabilities on them.” Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: Critical Tax 
Studies and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N. C. L. REV. 1771, 1179 (1998). He notes that unless 
scholars first answer the distributive question, any reforms designed to help same-sex couples 
could end up benefitting them doubly. See id. at 1774. If including same-sex couple would result 
in “special rights,” Johnson reasons that scholarly “interested in equality” would have to consider 
“how to reform the Code detrimentally to same-sex couples . . . not how to reform it beneficially 
to them.” Id. 
180
 Tony Infanti responded directly to Johnson’s objections. Infanti, supra note 28, at 765. He 
wrote: 
As a gay man, I was puzzled at how equal treatment could be boiled down to a 
simple cost-benefit analysis. How could Johnson have ignored the ways in 
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For critical tax scholars who view taxation as political, it was easy to see the 
non-recognition of same-sex marriages and partnerships as an infringement on the 
right to full participation in civil society—regardless of the net financial 
impact.181 Under this view, taxation is more than a simple calculation of tax due. 
The income tax system represents the primary way that individuals interact with 
the federal government. Despite how much Americans might like to complain 
about paying taxes, the United States has one of the highest tax compliance rates 
for any nation in the world. Americans are trained to report each year to the 
federal government, their gains and losses—both financially and personally. 
Taxpayers report whether they sold or bought a house, whether they were married 
or divorced, whether they had a child, and whether their spouse died. 
Working from this more expansive view of taxation, critical tax scholars 
argued that the preoccupation with whether same-sex couples were financially 
disadvantaged by individual filing missed the point. The objection was primarily 
one of exclusion—of remedying a point of explicit bias. Under DOMA, same-sex 
couples who were legally married in their state of residence had to file jointly for 
state income tax purposes but then disaggregate their income and expenses in 
order to file their federal income taxes individually. For their federal taxes, they 
had to use the “unmarried” tax schedule and then sign their individual returns 
under penalties of perjury. In some instances, same-sex couples may get a benefit 
from being required to file individually, but in other cases there will be a penalty. 
Edith Windsor, for example, had to pay $363,000 in additional federal estate tax 
because the IRS would not recognize her marriage to her long-time partner and 
wife. In either case, the principle of exclusion remains—an example of explicit 
bias that “has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays 
and lesbians . . . and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as 
inferior to those of opposite-sex couples.”182 
2. Implicit bias – “qualifying child” 
                                                                                                                                     
which the Code stigmatizes gays and lesbians and attempts to force them into 
the closet? Can any net tax benefit really make up for the patently unequal and 
discriminatory treatment visited by the federal government upon gays and 
lesbians through the medium of the Code? Put another way, can my recognition 
as a full member of society be bought at the cheap price of an exemption from 
the marriage penalty and from the various attribution and loss disallowance rules 
that apply to married couples? 
Id. 
181
 Id. (weighing “the cheap price of an exemption from the marriage penalty” with equality) 
182
 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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The federal income tax provides a number of benefits for taxpayers who are 
raising children, including dependency exemptions, child credits, the favorable 
head of household filing status, 183 and dependent care credits.184 In 2004, the 
varying definitions of “child” for all of these provisions were coordinated under 
the single definition of a “qualifying child.”185 The definition is very expansive 
and includes many relationships that would not be respected for probate purposes, 
such as “stepchildren” and “foster children.”186  Notwithstanding its expansive 
nature, it does not take into account the more than one million children who are 
being raised in the United States by same-sex couples, many of whom live in 
states where the non-biological parent or non-adoptive parent is unable to 
formalize his or her relationship with the child.187 This exclusion is not the result 
of DOMA, but rather an unintended consequence that could have been avoided 
(or openly acknowledged) if the provision had been drafted through a critical lens. 
                                                 
183
 Taxpayers who qualify as a head of household, as defined under section 2 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, are eligible for an increased standard deduction and favorable tax rates. An 
unmarried taxpayer is eligible for head of household filing status only when the taxpayer 
maintains a household for at least one other qualifying relative. A same-sex partner cannot quality 
as a “qualifying relative.” I.R.C. § 2 (2006). 
184
 Taxpayers are also entitled to a generous per child tax credit. I.R.C. § 24. (2006). The child 
must be under the age of 17. I.R.C. § 24(c)(1). The maximum credit is $1000 for each child, and it 
is phased out for higher income taxpayers. I.R.C. § 24(b)(1)-(2).  
185
 The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (“WFTRA”) sets a uniform definition of a 
qualifying child. Prior to the WFTRA, the definition of a qualifying child was not consistent 
throughout the Internal Revenue Code, and there were competing definitions in effect for purposes 
of dependency exemption, the child credit, the dependent care credit, the favorable head of 
household filing status, and the EITC. The lack of uniformity created considerable confusion on 
the part of taxpayers, and the new definition was considered a significant gain in terms of 
simplicity. The chair of the ABA Section of Taxation wrote to members of the House Ways and 
Means Committee to praise them for taking “an important and concrete step toward 
simplification.” Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Chair of the ABA Section of Taxation, to 
members of the House Comm. on Ways & Means and Senate Comm. on Fin. (Oct. 18, 2004), 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2004/041018hr1308. 
authcheckdam.pdf. The letter noted that simplification measures such as this were “critically 
important for an effective federal tax system.” Id. 
186
 I.R.C. § 152(f)(1) (2006). 
187
 Doris Nhna, Same-Sex Couples: U.S. Demographic Snapshot, NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 18, 
2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/statistics/same-sex-parents-u-s-
demographic-snapshot-20120618 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (estimating number of children); 
Parenting Laws: Second Parent or Stepparent Adoption, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Aug. 2, 
2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_second-parent-adoption_082013.pdf. In 
jurisdictions where second parent adoption is not available, non-biological co-parents are at a 
distinct disadvantage and the child is denied the security of having two legally recognized parents. 
A second-parent adoption allows a second parent to adopt a child without the “first parent” losing 
any parental rights. In this way, the child comes to have two legal parents. The effect of the 
adoption is to grant the non-biological parent equal rights in custody and visitation matters.  
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Separate and distinct from whether a child’s same-sex parents are 
considered married for federal tax purposes, the uniform definition of “qualifying 
child” precludes a non-biological parent from claiming a number of tax benefits 
available to taxpayers with “qualifying children,”188 if the parent lives in one of 
the eight states that does not allow second parent adoption. 189  Although the 
uniform definition of “qualifying child” was intended to be expansive, LGBT 
families living in these states will be ineligible to claim tax benefits that are 
designed to help taxpayers maximize the resources that are available for their 
children. These tax benefits, such as the EITC, are especially targeted to lower 
income, working families.190 
In an effort to reflect economic reality and the changing face of the 
American family, the uniform definition of “qualifying child” adopts a functional 
view of family, rather than the overly formal iterations of family often reflected in 
the probate code and other laws.191 Despite the broad reach of the statute, it is 
clear from IRS guidance that the definition of “qualifying child” does not extend 
to a non-biological child whom the taxpayer is co-parenting without some other 
indicia of relationship.192 In the absence of a statutorily approved relationship 
marker, a non-biological co-parent is merely acting in loco parentis and the child 
                                                 
188
 I.R.C. § 152(c). A child may count as a “qualifying child,” if the child is the taxpayer’s: child, 
stepchild, foster child, sibling, stepsibling, or descendant of any of the above. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1). 
An adopted child is considered a “child,” and includes a child who has been “placed with the 
taxpayer for legal adoption by the taxpayer.” I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(b). 
189
 Parenting Laws, supra note 187. In twenty-one states, second-parent adoption is available to 
same-sex couples state wide. Id. Eight states have obstacles to second-parent adoption for same-
sex couples and the availability of second-parent adoption is unclear in the remaining states. Id. 
190
 President George W. Bush signed the “qualifying child” legislation when he was on the 
campaign trail in Des Moines, Iowa. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks on 
Signing the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 in Des Moines, Iowa (Oct. 4, 2004), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72771#a xzz1Y3IXzJAD. During his remarks, 
President Bush singled out the Hintz family in Clive, Iowa for special mention. President Bush 
noted that the parents, Mike and Sharla, were frugal and always thought carefully about purchases 
and priorities for their four children. Id. Needless to say, President Bush did not he realize that he 
was holding up a youth pastor who had plead no contest to a charge of sexual exploitation brought 
by a counselor. Michael Hintz, Ex-Omaha Pastor Charged in Iowa, WOWT NEWS (Dec. 8, 2004, 
7:51 PM), http://www.wowt.com/ home/headlines/1137247.html. 
191
 In order to count as a “qualifying child,” the child must satisfy four tests: (1) relationship; (2) 
age; (3) residency; and (4) support. I.R.C. § 152(c). The relationship test is the most relevant for 
purposes of this discussion. It provides that the child must be the taxpayer’s son, daughter, brother, 
sister, step-brother, step-sister, or a descendant of any such individual. I.R.C. § 152(c)(2). An 
individual legally adopted by the taxpayer, or an individual who is lawfully placed with the 
taxpayer by an authorized placement agency for legal adoption by the taxpayer, is treated as a 
child of the taxpayer by blood. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(b). A foster child who is placed with the 
taxpayer by an authorized placement agency or by judgment, decree, or other order of any court of 
competent jurisdiction is treated as the taxpayer’s child. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(c).  
192
 I.R.C. § 152(c). 
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does not qualify.193 In the case of a taxpayer who is co-parenting in a state that 
does not allow second-parent adoption, the inability to claim the child as a 
“qualifying child” for purposes of the child credit, the head of household filing 
status, or the EITC can have significant tax consequences, especially if the non-
biological parent is the primary wage earner.194 
 If the uniform definition of “qualifying child” had been considered 
through a critical lens that took into account the effect of the provision on 
minority populations, marginalized groups, and the diversity of the families, it 
would have been possible to see the disparate impact that the definition would 
have on the children being raised by same-sex couples in states without second 
parent adoption. Assuming this disparate impact was undesirable, the problem 
could have been fixed through a slight modification in the statutory language 
recognizing a biological or adoptive parent’s partner.195 Even after the enactment, 
a comprehensive regulatory review conducted through a critical lens would catch 
the same problem, and the situation could easily be remedied through 
administrative action.196 
3. Interpretive discretion – medical treatment 
In 2006, the IRS disallowed Rhiannon O’Donnabhain’s medical expense 
deduction for hormone treatment, sex-reassignment surgery, and breast 
                                                 
193
 See Internal Revenue Serv., Publication 501: Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing 
Information (2012). Note this would not affect two unmarried co-habitants if they were both the 
parents of the child. In that case, both parents qualify and the parent with the higher income can 
claim the child. 
194
 The inequities created under the uniform definition of a “qualifying child” have the effect of 
penalizing families who choose to have one parent in the work force and the other caring for the 
children full-time. It further disadvantages couples and their children by limiting the choice of 
which parent will be a full-time caregiver. Although similarly situated married couples may 
choose which parent will fulfill that role without consequence, same-sex couples, as well as other 
unmarried couples, face negative tax consequences for the same decision. I.R.C. § 152(c).  
195
 It is clear that a dependent same-sex partner does not count as a “qualifying relative” for 
purposes of qualifying for the favorable head of household filing status. As a result, the higher 
income partner will not qualify for head of household filing status solely on account of a 
financially dependent partner. However, the higher income partner can qualify if there is also a 
“qualifying child” in the household. A child will satisfy the relationship test if the child is a 
biological child, or an adoptive child, a stepchild, or even a foster child, but not if the child is the 
child of the taxpayer’s partner. I.R.C. § 152(c)(2).  
196
 The Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) is currently considering adopting an expansive 
definition of child that would include non-biological children who are being co-parented by same-
sex parents for purposes of federal employees health insurance. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., 
GUIDE TO ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE PROGRAMS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, 10 n.80 (July 
2012), available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/worklife/ reference-
materials/adoption-benefits-guide-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2012 
 
 244
reconstruction surgery on the grounds that the treatment and surgery were 
“cosmetic” and did not qualify as “medical treatment” within the meaning of the 
statute. 197 , 198  The determination of whether the expenses qualified for the 
deduction depended on how the IRS chose to interpret the Code and Regulations 
in light of Ms. O’Donnabhain’s particular circumstances. There were no statutory 
or regulatory provisions expressly dealing with medical treatment and transgender 
taxpayers. At the time, there was also no IRS Guidance that addressed the 
issue. 199  Despite reports that similar medical expense deductions had been 
allowed in the past on an ad hoc basis, it was by all accounts a case of first 
impression.200 
Unlike the immediately preceding examples involving the marital 
provisions and the definition of “qualifying child,” the denial of Ms. 
O’Donnabhain’s tax deduction was not an instance of explicit or implicit bias. 
Instead, it provides an example of how cultural competency on the part of IRS 
officials is crucial to a fair and equitable administration of the tax laws. The 
denial of the deduction was based on shockingly outmoded and uninformed views 
of gender identity, and it was roundly criticized by medical experts, as well as by 
LGBT advocacy organizations.201 If the officials reviewing Ms. O’Donnabhain’s 
                                                 
197
 Taxpayers are allowed a deduction for medical expenses paid during the taxable year that are 
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent 
of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213 (2006). The statute specially provides that “cosmetic 
surgery” does not quality as “medical care.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(9). Cosmetic surgery is defined as 
“any procedure which is directed at improving the patient's appearance and does not meaningfully 
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.” I.R.C. § 
213(d)(9)(b). Cosmetic surgery does not include a “surgery or procedure [which] is necessary to 
ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal 
injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(a). 
198
 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 134 (2010).  
199
 The IRS acquiesced after the Tax Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer on two out of the three 
expenses she sought to deduct. Internal Revenue Serv., Action on Decision, IRB 2011-47 (Nov. 
21, 2011). 
200
 See Paul Caron, Tax Court to Decide Deductibility of Sex-Change Operation, TAXPROFBLOG 
(July 18, 2007), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2007/07/deductibility-o.html (noting a 
1983 case where father deducted travel costs related to son’s gender reassignment). 
201
 For example, Dr. Marshall Forstein, an associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical 
School remarked, “It’s absolutely clear that transgender identity is a condition discussed in 
diagnostic manuals. It seems the IRS is now in the business of practicing medicine without a 
license." Anthony Faiola, Woman Suing IRS Over Sex-Change Tax Claims, Oct. 7, 2007, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 7, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001194.html. Gender Identity Disorder is a stabled 
medical disorder described under section 302.85 of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders-IV, the authoritative handbook used for the diagnosis of mental disorders. AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 537-38 
(4th ed. 1994). Despite this widespread level of recognition, the Internal Revenue Service 
described the medical treatment as “controversial.” See infra note 210. 
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2001 tax return had employed a critical lens that included gender identity, the 
dispute could have been avoided.202  
Shortly after she received her refund check, Ms. O’Donnabhain was 
notified that her income tax return was being audited.203 When the audit examiner 
disallowed her medical expense deduction on the grounds that it was “cosmetic” 
in nature, Ms. O’Donnabhain requested reconsideration by the regional IRS 
Appeals Office.204 The appeals officer then requested and received advice from 
the Chief Counsel’s Office of the IRS that affirmed the denial of the deduction, 
representing the final decision by the IRS. 205  The Chief Counsel’s Advice 
Memorandum (CCA) rested its decision on the bare assertion that “whether 
gender reassignment surgery is a treatment for an illness or a disease is 
controversial.” 206  This statement is directly at odds with the great weight of 
medical opinion on the subject, which was not addressed in the CCA. Even more 
disturbing, however, was that the source cited in support of the statement was an 
article from a religious blog.207 Indeed, the article from the blog was the only 
                                                 
202
 Although not possible to measure the emotional costs to Ms. O’Donnabhain, it may be worth 
noting that the Tax Court awarded her attorneys’ fees. Ed Whelan, Obama IRS’s $250,000 
Giveaway to GLAD, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, (Dec. 1, 2010) http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-
memos/254261/obama-irs-s-250000-giveaway-glad-ed-whelan (noting O’Donnabhain’s attorneys 
were awarded $250,000 in costs by agreement of the parties). 
203
 Faiola, supra note 201 (describing the taxpayer as “a former construction engineer from a 
devout Irish Catholic family in Boston”).  
204
 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).  
205
 Internal Revenue Serv., Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum, 200603025 (Oct. 14, 2005). The 
Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum (CCA) states, “Whether gender reassignment surgery is a 
treatment for an illness or disease is controversial.” Id. It continues: “For instance, Johns Hopkins 
Hospital has closed its gender reassignment clinic and ceased performing these operations.” In 
support for these propositions, the CCA cited to First Things, which is “an interreligious, 
nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is to advance a religiously informed 
public philosophy for the ordering of society.” Masthead, FIRST THINGS, 
http://www.firstthings.com/masthead (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). The citation used to support the 
disallowance was to the following article currently available in the archive section of the website 
maintained by First Things: Paul McHugh, Surgical Sex, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2004) 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/02/surgical-sex--35 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). On 
March 29, 2013, the advertisements that framed the article included one for the DVD boxed-set 
“Catholicism” and another for the Sacred Heart Major Seminary that was looking for a “candidate 
for Old Testament and Biblical Languages.” Id. After citing the blog post, the CCA concluded: “In 
light of the Congressional emphasis on denying a deduction for procedures relating to appearance 
in all but a few circumstances and the controversy surrounding whether GRS is a treatment for an 
illness or disease, the materials submitted do not support a deduction.” Chief Counsel Advice 
Memorandum 200603025. The CCA found that the deduction could not be allowed in the absence 
of an “unequivocal expression of Congressional intent that expenses of this type qualify under 
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authority cited in the CCA to support its conclusion that medical treatment for 
gender identity disorder is “controversial.”208 
Ms. O’Donnabhain appealed to the Tax Court, where the court ultimately 
allowed the deduction for hormone treatment and sex-reassignment surgery, but 
disallowed the deduction for breast reconstruction on the grounds that it was 
“cosmetic.”209 The IRS acquiesced the following year.210 The Tax Court decision, 
however, was not unanimous, and some of the concurring and dissenting judges 
openly expressed their discomfort with the fact of Ms. O’Donnabhain’s particular 
point of difference.211 In his concurrence, Judge Holmes bristled at the “crash 
course on transsexualism that this case has forced on us.”212 He also faulted the 
majority opinion, saying that it “drafts our Court into culture wars in which tax 
lawyers have heretofore claimed noncombatant status.”213  
The discontent expressed by the judges on the Tax Court suggests that the 
imposition of a critical lens will not be without critics. However, this resistance 
also illustrates why cultural competency is so necessary in the context of 
discretionary decision making. At each juncture along the way—audit, appeals, 
Chief Counsel’s Office, and the Tax Court—Ms. O’Donnabhain was forced to 
explain her difference and why it mattered.  
 
III. DESIGNING CRITICAL TOOLS 
 
As discussed in Part II, applying a critical lens to tax policy involves three 
steps. First, it is necessary to refute the myth of taxpayer neutrality. Second, it is 
essential to establish which identity characteristics are relevant, recognizing that 
                                                 
208
 By choosing to rely on outmoded and discredited medical research, the CCA rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument that the surgery was medically necessary to treat a condition listed in the 
Diagnostic & Statistical Manual IV and that surgical intervention is a medically accepted standard 
of care.  
209
 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r., 134 T.C. 34, 70, 72-73 (2010). The majority disallowed the 
deduction for breast augmentation surgery on the grounds that it was cosmetic surgery. IRC § 
213(d)(9). Amounts paid by taxpayers for breast reconstruction surgery following mastectomy for 
cancer, as well as for vision correction surgery, are considered deductible medical care expenses. 
Id. at 90-91. The IRS has also allowed a medical expense deduction for the cost of a hair 
transplant for 24 year old who suffered from premature baldness. See Mattes v. Comm’r., 77 TC 
650 (1981).  
210
 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r., 134 T.C. 34 (2010), action on dec., 2011-47 I.R.B. (Nov. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-aod/aod201103.pdf. 
211
 See Anthony C. Infanti, Dissecting O’Donnabhain, TAX NOTES, Mar. 15, 2010, at 1403, 1404–
05 (concluding that “it will be difficult for LGBT taxpayers to walk away from reading these 
opinions harboring any hope that they will get a hearing in the Tax Court that is unaffected by 
their sexual orientation or gender identity”). 
212
 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 86 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
213
 Id. at 85. 
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the different classes of characteristics will necessarily change and evolve over 
time. Third, it is important to consider the procedural and more practical aspects 
of how the critical lens should be administered or even enforced—to ask where it 
fits in the policymaking process. Is it simply an auditing procedure that will 
evaluate whether remedial steps are desirable when bias is identified in the tax 
system? Or is it a process that can be included at the outset to avoid a situation 
such as the under-inclusive uniform definition of a “qualifying child?” What 
about the exercise of agency discretion that was so hopelessly misinformed in 
O'Donnabhain? Can a constructive critical lens be imposed on all agency action?  
This Part discusses these thorny procedural issues and proposes three 
different measures, all of which are based on existing legislative and 
administrative institutional traditions and procedures. These measures are: (1) 
enhanced information collection; (2) the creation of a diversity expenditure 
budget; and (3) the requirement of diversity impact statements. Although the 
diversity expenditure budget and the diversity impact statement are separate 
proposals that could be adopted independently, the enhanced information 
collection is the necessary first step in this process. Without adequate data, it will 
continue to be impossible to construct models to measure the impact of taxation 
on inequality in the United States. 
One of the earliest detractors of critical tax theory, Larry Zelenak, famously 
complained that “mere critique without a workable solution does nothing to better 
anyone’s situation.” 214  Although his characterization of critical tax theory as 
“mere critique” misapprehends the nature of critical theory, his emphasis on a 
workable solution is worth repeating. Each of the proposals described below 
carries with it certain negative externalities that range from reifying artificially 
constructed categories of race to placing additional costs on an already 
cumbersome rulemaking process. They are only designed to be the starting point 
of a larger conversation—a point of departure for future study and debate. They 
represent logical solutions based on existing institutional patterns and practices. If 
they are not feasible to implement because the political will is lacking or the cost 
is too great, then those choices should be acknowledged rather than justified 
under the mantel of taxpayer neutrality. 
A. Good Policy Requires Good Data 
Simply put, good policy requires good data. Critical tax policy requires 
enhanced data collection that will allow policymakers to evaluate and measure the 
impact of taxation on existing disparities by reference to identity group 
classifications. The IRS currently does not collect demographic data such as race, 
                                                 
214
 Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1524 (emphasis added). For a response, see Staudt, supra note 120, 
at 1581 (referring to Zelenak’s “single-minded focus on solutions” as “both ironic and bizarre”). 
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ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. 215  Although various 
census initiatives capture some of this information, it is not cross-referenced with 
federal income tax records.216 Social Security records provide another source of 
demographic information, but they are also not cross-referenced with tax files.217 
As a result, the information necessary to engage in a critical analysis of the tax 
code is currently not available. 
There are several possible ways to remedy this situation. The most 
straightforward would be to allow taxpayers to provide identifying characteristics 
on their tax returns. The IRS would then be able to code tax returns for 
demographic characteristics and produce a statistical analysis of tax burdens and 
benefits based on race, ethnicity, or whatever characteristics it chooses to query. It 
would also be possible to collect tax information through the Census or cross-
reference tax and census data or tax and social security data. 218  There are 
numerous objections to each method given the growing debate over the 
desirability of the collection of public racial and ethnic information by 
government entities, but a full discussion of the most effective way to collect data 
is well outside the scope of this article.219 
                                                 
215
 The U.S. Individual Income Tax Return only inquires regarding two very specific points of 
disability and age: whether the taxpayer is 65 years of age or older and whether the taxpayer is 
blind. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. Individual Income Tax 
Return Form 1040, OMB No. 1545-0074, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf. 
Both of these points are necessary to determine whether the taxpayer is entitled to a higher 
standard deduction. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Guide for Seniors, Publication 554, ch. 4 
(2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p554/ch04.html.  
216
 See Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 757-58. Moran and Whitford engaged in their own 
statistical analysis to determine the impact of the tax code on black taxpayers. They “analyzed data 
about lifestyle differences using race and income alone as relevant categories.” They also analyzed 
and reported about “black/white lifestyle differences after controlling for a limited number of 
additional characteristics of SES [socioeconomic status].” Id. 
217
 See Moran, supra note 38, at 1633. Moran notes: 
However, a study that measures compliance in addition to tax liability requires 
either race-coded returns or sophisticated taxpayer surveys. Tax returns are not 
race-coded and there are no compliance studies by race that address the 
questions we raise in A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code. Although 
tax returns are not coded by race, they can be cross-matched by race through 
Social Security numbers. However, cross-matching against Social Security 
numbers requires security clearance. 
Id. 
218
 Id. (discussing “sophisticated taxpayer surveys”). 
219
 See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Briefing on the Consequences of Government Data 
Race Collection Bans on Civil Rights, May 17, 2002, available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/ civrightsbrief51702.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2013). 
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1. Taxpayer neutrality and the collection of demographic data 
The failure to capture demographic information reflects the strong 
commitment to taxpayer neutrality that was discussed in greater detail in Part I. 
When combined with the bounded nature of tax policy, the commitment to 
taxpayer neutrality creates an impenetrable tautology where the only significant 
distinguishing feature among taxpayers is income level and, because of that, 
income level is the only distinguishing characteristic that the IRS collects and 
analyzes. Many of the criticisms of critical tax theory exploited this tautology, 
arguing that critical tax scholars could not make broad based evaluative 
statements without reliable data. 220 The criticism, however, merely highlights the 
Catch-22 created by the blanket assumption of taxpayer neutrality. If the only 
salient distinction among taxpayers is income level, then it makes sense to only 
analyze taxpayer data based on income level. However, if taxpayer data is only 
collected and analyzed based on income level, there is no possible way to 
establish that there are other salient features that warrant attention.221  
By contrast, agencies across the federal government regularly collect and 
use demographic data relating to race, ethnicity, disability, and gender.222 Beyond 
these recognized categories, the Department of Health and Human Services has 
recently announced that it will start collecting data on sexual orientation and 
gender identity for certain purposes.223  Even the Department of the Treasury 
collects demographic data on race for some non-tax related purposes, such as the 
Home Affordable Modification Program.224 In some instances, the data collection 
is mandated in order to measure compliance with anti-discrimination laws, but in 
                                                 
220
 See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal Income Tax: Has a Disparate Impact 
Case Been Made?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1823 (1998).  
221
 In other words, starting from a strong presumption of taxpayer neutrality mandates that there is 
no possible way to test the original presumption because any data that could potentially undermine 
the presumption has been deemed irrelevant and, as a result, does not exist.  
222
 Federal public policy has been race and diversity conscious since the mid-1960s. 
223
 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Affordable Care Act to Improve Data Collection, 
Reduce Health Disparities, June 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/06/20110629a.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). Under 
Section 4302 of the Affordable Care Act, data collection efforts to understand health disparities 
relating to race, ethnicity, sex, primary language and disability status are required. However, the 
Secretary has authority to require additional standards. HHS has announced that it will integrate 
questions on sexual orientation into national data collection efforts by 2013 and begin a process to 
collect information on gender identity. Id.  
224
 Applicants and homeowners in the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) 
program are requested, but not required, to provide race and ethnicity information in order to 
obtain a mortgage modification. Making Home Affordable Data File Summary, 
MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.GOV (Jan. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/MHA%20Data%20File%20Summary_ new.pdf.  
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other instances it is used to track and address existing disparities. Given that 
taxation is a component of the broader fiscal policy and includes significant 
spending items in the form of tax expenditures, the IRS’s lack of interest in 
demographic differences in terms of its burdens or benefits seems out of step with 
the practices of other federal agencies. 
Federal public policy has been diversity-conscious since the mid-1960s 
when the passage of landmark civil rights legislation made reliable demographic 
data essential for enforcement purposes. For example, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 mandated equal treatment in the workforce and created the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to monitor compliance 
with the law.225 To assist in its enforcement efforts, the EEOC imposed reporting 
requirements on certain employers regarding the race and ethnicity of their 
employees. 226  Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
collects data to measure compliance with the Fair Housing Act of 1968.227 Indeed, 
the collection of demographic data relating to race and ethnicity became so 
widespread, that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) later formalized 
the standards to be used for all federal purposes when collecting data on race or 
ethnicity in Directive 15.228 
Beyond enforcement efforts, information collection is essential to many 
federal programs that are funded based on data from the decennial Census, 
including programs that promote equal employment opportunities and those that 
assess racial disparities in health and environmental risks.229 Demographic data is 
also necessary to monitor compliance with the Voting Rights Act and the 
bilingual election rules. 230  There are also obligations imposed on local 
governments, which are required to identify underserved segments of the 
population, such as those requiring medical services under the Public Health 
Service Act. 231  Demographic data is also necessary to ensure that financial 
institutions are meeting the credit needs of minority populations under the 
Community Reinvestment Act.232 When the OMB last revised Directive 15, it 
                                                 
225
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012). 
226
 Id.  
227
 Catherine Lee & John D. Skrentny, Race Categorization and the Regulation of Business and 
Science, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 617, 618 (2010) (explaining that “in 1965 this agency issued a 
regulation requiring all businesses with at least 100 employees to fill out a form, the EEO-1, that 
categorized all employees based on their employer-perceived identities as white, black, ‘Spanish-
American,’ ‘Oriental,’ or ‘American Indian’”).  
228
 Id. at 617-19 (describing the history of OMB Directive 15). 
229
 Definition: Ethnic Groups, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
https://ask.census.gov/faq.php?id =5000&faqId=7557. 
230
 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. 
231
 Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.  
232
 Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq. 
Vol. 9.2]   Nancy J. Knaur 
 251
organized an interagency working group that was comprised of representatives 
from thirty different agencies that utilized demographic data in their program 
development and implementation,233 representing the breadth of data collection 
efforts across the federal government. 
2. Too much, too little, or not at all 
Despite the fact that there is a long history at the federal level of collecting 
demographic data for the commendable purpose of furthering civil rights, the 
practice has recently been the subject of sustained criticism from a variety of 
interests. LGBT advocacy organizations have increasingly argued that sexual 
orientation and gender identity should be queried on the Census and other national 
surveys, such as the National Health Interview Survey administered by the 
National Institutes of Health. 234  Multiracial advocates have argued for the 
expansion of racial categories or have rejected them completely. 235  The 
proponents of “racial privacy” have also argued against the use of racial 
categories but on starkly different grounds. 236  Accordingly, any proposal to 
increase data collection for tax purposes would likely encounter criticism on a 
number of fronts. 
At first glance, the objections of LGBT advocacy groups seems easy to 
remedy—simply add a query regarding sexual orientation and gender identity to 
all relevant national data sets. By advocating in favor of extending diversity-
conscious federal policies to include LGBT individuals, LGBT organizations 
accept the importance of demographic data as an effective way to monitor civil 
rights protections.237 However, the country remains deeply divided over issues 
                                                 
233
 See Kim M. Williams, Racial Statistics and Race-Conscious Public Policy. TAUBMAN CENTER 
POLICY BRIEF, May 2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-
programs/centers/taubman/williams_new.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (describing the inter-
agency working group). See also Lee & Skrentny, supra note 227,at 618 (In terms of the range of 
agencies collecting data, Lee and Skrentny noted that “[t]he National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
Revitalization Act of 1993 required the NIH to establish guidelines for including women and 
minorities in clinical research—called the Inclusion Mandate, which the agency implemented in 
1994.”). 
234
 National Coalition for LGBT Health, LGBT Inclusion in Federal Health Surveys, (Dec. 2010), 
available at 
http://lgbthealth.webolutionary.com/sites/default/files/LGBT%20Inclusion%20in%20Surveys_0.p
df (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
235
 See Williams, supra note 233 (describing the goals of the “multi-racial movement”). 
236
 Patricia J. Williams, Racial Privacy, THE NATION, June 17, 2002 (describing the “racial privacy 
movement”). 
237
 The President of the Human Rights Campaign explained that data collection was necessary to 
“understand if the country is meeting the public-policy needs of [LGBT] Americans.” Carroll 
Morello, Census Count of Same-Sex Couples to Stir Policy Fights, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2009 
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related to LGBT civil rights, suggesting that the inclusion of sexual orientation 
and gender identity would not be without controversy. For example, leading up to 
the 2010 Census, the Census Bureau took the position that it would not be able to 
“count” the same-sex couples who reported that they were “married”238 because 
to do so would violate DOMA.239 Even if it were possible to get a consensus that 
sexual orientation and gender identity should be included in the critical lens and, 
therefore, data on sexual orientation and gender identity should be collected, there 
remains considerable disagreement and uncertainty regarding how best to pose 
questions that would capture the full range of LGBT lives and identities.240 
In contrast to the LGBT groups who want to be included in the data 
collection, there are other groups who want to be able to opt out of the data 
collection. The multiracial movement that began in the 1990s argued that the 
racial categories reflected on the Census and prescribed through OMB’s Directive 
15 were overly reductive by forcing individuals to choose a single identity 
category.241 The movement was successful, in part, by getting OMB to endorse a 
“mark one or more” (MOOM) approach such that respondents can now choose 
more than one category to reflect intersecting or multiple identities.242 
Related to the multiracial objection, there is also a post-racial or post-
identity critique that argues against the collection of racial and ethnic data by the 
federal government on the grounds that it reinforces a socially constructed 
category of difference that has historically been used as a tool of subordination.243 
                                                                                                                                     
(quoting Joe Solmonese, then-President of the Human Rights Campaign). See also Williams, 
supra note 233, at 2 (explaining that “in the 1960s, racial classifications became useful for the 
purpose of enforcing and monitoring civil rights laws”).  
238
 Morello, supra note 237 (explaining the controversy).  
239
 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7).  
240
 See Gary J. Gates, LGBT Identity: A Demographer’s Perspective, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 
(2012). 
241
 Williams, supra note 233 (“The American multiracial movement is best known for its 




 Kimani Paul-Emile, The Regulation of Race in Science, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1115, 1131-
1132 (2012). Paul-Emile provides the following definition of race in the context of biomedical 
research: 
Race is a social construct, which means that racial categories, the meaning we 
attach to these categories, and the way we determine which individuals will be 
assigned to these categories, are all driven by social, cultural, and historical 
practices, and are not determined a priori by genetics. We assign certain 
meanings (e.g., stereotypes and attitudes) to the racial categories we have 
constructed, which inform the ways individuals and groups are perceived. 
Id. See also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
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The post-identity concern is that the continued deployment of outmoded and 
artificial categories by the federal government has the effect of naturalizing race, 
and racializing certain government policies and practices. The response to the 
post-racial critique is that although race is socially constructed, it continues to 
have social, political, and economic consequences and meaning.244 As a result, 
“racial pragmatism” would dictate that salient identity characteristics continue to 
be taken into account for purposes of building a diversity-conscious policy that 
remains aware of the limitations and dangers inherent in the act of 
characterization.245 
The racial privacy movement also objects to the collection of demographic 
data by the government but on very different grounds. The movement started as 
an outgrowth of the anti-affirmative action movement that had argued 
successfully in the 1990s against preferences based on race, gender, and 
ethnicity.246 The racial privacy movement, however, takes that argument against 
racial or ethnic preferences one step further. It asserts that the government should 
not collect information on race or ethnicity in the first instance—let alone use it 
for preferences. The racial privacy movement asserts that the collection of such 
information by the government violates privacy rights by compelling an 
individual to divulge racially identifying information. 247  In 2004, California 
voters defeated Proposition 54 that would have prohibited state and local 
governments from using race, ethnicity, color, or national origin to classify 
current or prospective students, contractors or employees in public education, 
contracting, or employment operations.248 Although the initiative was defeated, it 
still garnered over three million votes.249 
The racial privacy movement posed a direct challenge to civil rights 
protections and safeguards by claiming that the government should be prohibited 
                                                                                                                                     
(NYU Press 1st ed. 1996). 
244
 Paul-Emile, supra note 243, at 1131. As Paul-Emile observes, “the overwhelming consensus 
among geneticists majority is that ‘among modern humans, there’s no such thing as race.’” 
(quoting Joseph L. Graves, Jr., Ph.D., Dean of University Studies and Professor of Biological 
Sciences, North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University). 
245
 Paul-Emile endorses “racial pragmatism in the biomedical . . . context.” Id. at 1168. He 
concludes: “This Article argues that federal regulations must allow for the use of racial categories 
in biomedical studies. However, they must do so in a way that does not allow researchers to 
jeopardize individual and public health or reify outmoded, pejorative, and stigmatizing notions of 
racial distinctions.” Id. at 1173. 
246
 See Glenn C. Loury, When Color Should Count, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2002) (arguing in favor of 
“modest violations of race blindness that yield significant reductions in racial inequality”), 




 2003 California State-Wide Special Election: Proposition 54, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, 
http://vote2003.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/mapR054.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
249
 Id. 
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from collecting demographic data. Without reliable data, it would be impossible 
to enforce anti-discrimination laws or measure disparities.250 In some ways, racial 
privacy could also describe the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in place for 
taxpayer information.251 Willful blindness of the type mandated by Proposition 54 
or practiced under the myth of taxpayer neutrality does not change the reality of 
inequality or the persistence of bigotry and bias. When asked to comment on 
Proposition 54, the American Association of Sociologists explained that “refusing 
to employ racial categories for administrative purposes and for social research 
does not eliminate their use in daily life, both by individuals and within social and 
economic institutions.” 252 
B. Diversity Expenditure Budget 
A diversity expenditure budget would make visible the allocation of tax 
benefits by race, gender, ethnicity, and whatever other classifications were 
included in the critical lens. In 1998 Beverly Moran called for Congress to create 
a “Race Expenditure Budget” that would “parallel the annual Tax Expenditure 
Budget” and show “what racial disparities exist in the enjoyment of tax 
benefits.”253 Her proposal clearly presaged the growing call for “gender-sensitive” 
                                                 
250
 For example, in 1996 California voters approved ballot initiative Proposition 209, which 
prohibited state government institutions from considering race, sex, or ethnicity, specifically in the 
areas of public employment, public contracting, or public education. B. Drummond Ayres, 
Affirmative Action Battle Moves to the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996. The success of 
Proposition 209 was followed by the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court cases, Gratz v. Bollinger and 
Grutter v. Bollinger that challenged the race-based admissions policies at the University of 
Michigan. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
251
 Patricia J. Williams, Racial Privacy, THE NATION (May 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.thenation.com/ article/racial-privacy.  
252
 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION ON 
THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING DATA AND DOING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON RACE 
(2003) available at http://www2.asanet.org/ media/asa_race_statement.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013). The American Sociological Association supported data collection because:  
[A] large body of social science research documents the role and consequences 
of race in primary social institutions and environments, including the criminal 
justice, education and health systems, job markets, and where people live. These 
studies illustrate how racial hierarchies are embedded in daily life, from racial 
profiling in law enforcement, to ‘red-lining’ communities of color in mortgage 




 Moran, supra note 38, at 1634. In an earlier article with William Whitford, Moran had 
forcefully argued that “Ignoring the impact that the Internal Revenue Code has on black welfare is 
a tradition that must stop.” Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 803. 
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budgeting,254 but it chose race as the distinguishing feature and used the familiar 
concept of the tax expenditure budget as a point of reference.255  A diversity 
expenditure budget would broaden Moran’s call for a “Race Expenditure Budget” 
to include gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and potentially other 
identity groups as well. 
As explained in Part I, the tax expenditure budget was mandated by 
Congress in 1974.256 The President’s annual budget submission to Congress is 
required to contain a list of tax expenditures, prepared by the Treasury 
Department. 257  The Joint Committee on Taxation also prepares its own tax 
expenditure budget. 258  The addition of demographic information would allow 
policymakers (and voters) to see how tax expenditures, such as the mortgage 
interest deduction, are allocated across identity groups. By disrupting the blanket 
assumption of taxpayer neutrality, the diversity expenditure budget would directly 
further the original goals of the tax expenditure budget, namely increased 
transparency and better budget management. 259  It would also treat tax 
expenditures more in line with other types of fiscal programs where the federal 
government expresses concerns over disparities and unequal access.  
A diversity expenditure budget also finds support in the concept of “gender 
budgeting” that has been implemented in a number of countries.260 Popularized 
after the 1995 United Nations Fourth Congress on Women in Beijing, gender 
budgeting is designed to further distributive transparency. 261  The Platform of 
Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women called on 
governments to “[f]acilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and transparent 
budget processes”262 and mandated “the integration of a gender perspective in 
                                                 
254
 See Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 843 (describing the advent of gender-sensitive 
budgeting). 
255
 When Surrey sought to make visible a form of indirect spending that was otherwise hidden 
within the tax code, his goal was to improve the budgeting process by requiring policymakers to 
acknowledge openly the various preferences and subsidies that represented departures from the 
structural provisions of the code. See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33. 
256
 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 
(1974). 
257






 Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 843 (discussing gender-sensitive budgeting). For an 
overview of Gender Responsive Budget Initiatives, see generally U.N. Women, U.N. Women 
Initiatives, GENDER RESPONSIVE BUDGETING, http://www.gender-
budgets.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15& Itemid=187 (last visited Apr. 
5, 2013).  
261
 Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 843. See also Rep. of Fourth World Conf. on Women, 
Sept. 4-15, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996); U.N. Women, GENDER RESPONSIVE 
BUDGETING, http://www.gender-budgets.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
262
 Rep. of Fourth World Conf. on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2012 
 
 256
budgetary decisions on policies and programs.”263 A “gender-sensitive budget” is 
designed to question fiscal policy that is presumed to be neutral and explore its 
impact in light of gender roles and the differing economic status of men and 
women.264 
Gender budgeting is a component of a larger move toward “gender 
mainstreaming” that has gained international acceptance and could provide a 
useful model for the development and implementation of a critical lens not only 
for tax policy, but for all domestic fiscal policy.265 Consistent with the goals of 
critical tax policy, gender mainstreaming focuses on revealing false neutrality. For 
example, a report on gender mainstreaming from the Council of Europe, 
recommends that efforts should first focus on points widely held to be “gender-
neutral,” saying the results will be “eye-opening.” The report stated: 
It might be useful to start with gender mainstreaming policy areas 
that are habitually labelled as gender-neutral. All policy areas 
which affect the daily life of citizens, such as transport policies, 
urban policies, [and] social policies are definitely important, 
although this is often not recognised. The same goes for research 
policies, because this is an important area to generate knowledge. 
Mainstreaming these policy areas might be very efficient, given the 
eye-opening effect it will produce. This effect will be very useful 
for convincing policy-makers and people of the need for gender 
mainstreaming, even when basic gender equality seems to be 
achieved.266 
                                                                                                                                     
(1996). See also Commonwealth Secretariat, GENDER AFFAIRS DEP’T, DEBBIE BUDLENDER ET AL., 
GENDER BUDGETS MAKE CENTS: UNDERSTANDING GENDER RESPONSIVE BUDGETS 1 (2002).  
263
 Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 845. The immediate response from the United Nations and 
other international entities was to provide support for a wide range of “gender budgeting” projects. 
264
 Id. at 843. Phillips & Stewart note, “A variety of methods are used to reveal and analyze the 
differential impacts of taxes and spending on women and men, in terms of both the distribution of 
costs and benefits, and behavioral effects (for example, marginal choices between paid and unpaid 
labor, or the effectiveness of business incentives).” Id. 
265
 Martha Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of An Antidiscrimination Approach To 
Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012). See also Equal. Div., Directorate Gen. of Human Rights, 
Council of Eur., Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation 
of Good Practices 23 (2005), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gender-
mainstreaming/EG_S_MS_98_2_rev_en.pdf (providing a comprehensive review of gender 
mainstreaming, including reports on various governments' processes) (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
266
 Fineman, supra note 265, at 1740 (quoting Equal. Div., Directorate Gen. of Human Rights, 
Council of Eur., Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation 
of good Practices 23 (2004), available at 
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Turning back to critical tax policy, a diversity expenditure budget would 
provide crucial information for policy makers. As a component of the budgeting 
process, it would greatly advance transparency goals. With the information 
provided by the diversity expenditure budget, policymakers would have access to 
distributional data broken down by relevant demographics characteristics. 
Whether they choose to act on the data or not, they would at least have to 
acknowledge the distributional effects. The diversity expenditure budget could be 
implemented by an act of Congress like the original tax expenditure or instituted 
through executive action that would direct the Department of Treasury to prepare 
as an optional budget to reflect these certain distributional concerns. 
C. Diversity Assessment Statement  
Although a diversity expenditure budget would allow for reflection on the 
part of policy maker, a diversity impact statement described below could 
conceivably act as a filter or check for all major government actions. A diversity 
impact statement would be to evaluate governmental actions before they are 
implemented in order to determine the potential for disparate impact on the 
different identity groups defined by race, gender, ethnicity, and whatever other 
classifications were included in the critical lens. In this way, a diversity impact 
statement would help policy makers avoid the unintended consequences that can 
arise when implicit bias becomes incorporated in the tax code. The diversity 
impact statement could be restricted to taxation or extended more broadly. 
Similarly, it could be limited to regulatory action or extend to legislative action as 
well. 
The concept of a diversity impact statement finds support in the well-
established practice of imposing various value-based requirements or safeguards 
on legislative and agency action.267  Starting in the 1970s, the legislative and 
executive branches both began to impose requirements on agency action that were 
designed to ensure that it was consistent with other broadly held federal policies. 
268
 These requirements were sometimes in the form of “impact assessments” or 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gender-
mainstreaming/EG_S_MS_98_2_ rev_en.pdf ). 
267
 Although some impact assessments have applied to legislative action, the majority have been 
designed to curtail agency power.  
268
 The most well-known impact assessment is the environmental impact statement. The 
International Association for Impact Assessment (“IAIA”) defines an environmental impact 
assessment as “the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, 
social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken 
and commitments made.” What is Impact Assessment?, INT’L ASS’N OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Oct. 
2009) available at http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/What%20is%20IA 
_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).  
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could also take the form of balancing tests.269 Over the years, these value-specific 
policy lenses have included environmental risks, 270  respect for federalism, 271 
respect for the family, 272  concern over takings issues, 273  and the impact of 
regulation on small businesses. 274  These “impact assessments” or “impact 
statements”275 required the agency to undergo a process of evaluation designed to 
predict the effect of proposed federal agency action on a pre-defined set of values 
or standards.276 Accordingly, “impact assessments” have the power to impose 
specific value checks on otherwise value-blind policy, and they represent a 
familiar way to implement the critical lens that is essential to critical tax policy. 
Perhaps the most well-known impact assessment is the Environmental 
                                                 
269
 See, e.g., The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 864 (1980) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612) (mandates consideration of impact of proposed regulations on 
small businesses and other small entities). Early in his first term, President Reagan expanded 
executive control over rulemaking with Executive Order 12,291. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 13,193, 3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 127 (Feb. 17,1981). This Executive Order required federal 
agencies to take regulatory action only if, “the potential benefits to society for the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs to society.” Id. Agencies were also instructed to submit to the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) a “regulatory impact analysis” of the potential costs and 
benefits for any proposed rule likely to be economically significant. Id. 
270
 See the Nat’l Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347d, requiring the development 
of the Environmental Impact Statement. 
271
 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg.R 41,685, 3 C.F.R., 1987 Comp., p. 252 (Oct. 26, 1987). 
Executive Order 12,612 (entitled ‘‘Federalism’’) prohibits an agency from publishing any rule that 
has federalism implications if the rule either: (i) Imposes substantial direct compliance costs on 
State and local governments and is not required by statute, or (ii) preempts State law, unless the 
agency meets the consultation and funding requirements of section 6 of the Executive Order. 
272
 Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188, 3 C.F.R. 1987 Comp., 241 (Sept. 9, 1987) 
(entitled “The Family”). 
273
 Executive Order 12,630 addressed the New Right’s belief that individual private property rights 
were being eroded by the actions of the federal government. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 
8859, 3 C.F.R., 1988 Comp., 554 (Mar. 15, 1988). It ordered agency action to take into account 
the “obligations imposed on the Federal government by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.” Id. To some extent, impact assessments such as these do not really break any new 
ground. In many cases, agencies are simply being urged to comply with the demands of the U.S. 
Constitution.  
274
 The Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”), 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., generally requires an agency 
to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to notice and comment rulemaking 
requirements, unless the agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities. The key requirement of the law is that federal agencies 
must analyze the impact of their regulatory actions on small entities (small businesses, small non-
profit organizations and small jurisdictions of government) and, where the regulatory impact is 
likely to be “significant”, affecting a “substantial number” of these small entities, seek less 
burdensome alternatives for them.  
275
 The statute requires an agency to include a statement on “the environmental impact” as well as 
alternatives to the proposed course of action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) and (iii) (2013). 
276
 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).  
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Impact Statement (“EIS”), which was introduced by the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).277 NEPA required federal agencies to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in advance of certain agency actions 
“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” in order to assess 
their potential impact.278 An EIS is required to describe:  
 
1) the environmental impacts of the proposed action; 
2) any adverse environmental impacts that cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented; 
3) the reasonable alternatives to the proposed action; 
4) the relationship between local short-term uses of the 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity; and 
5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
that would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented.279 
 
Designed as a tool to enhance federal decision-making, the goal of the EIS 
is to make sure that federal agency action is based on informed and thorough 
analysis that takes environmental concerns into account. 280  The supersonic 
Concorde provided the first major test for the EIS, 281  when environmental 
advocates successfully stalled its introduction to U.S. airspace in the 1970s.282 
Immediately after the perceived success of the environmentalists, progressive 
family advocates lobbied for an impact statement requirement for any government 
                                                 
277
 The Nat’l Environmental Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190, § 2, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.). The first widely publicized application of the new EIS requirements was 
the successful delay of the Super Sonic Transport (SST), also known as the Concorde. Robert B. 
Donin, Safety Regulation of the Concorde: Realistic Confinement of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 47 (1976). Environmentalists objected to the potential for noise 
pollution, as well as the plane’s impact on the ozone, its lack of fuel efficiency, and its safety risks. 
Walter Sullivan, Experts Fear Great Peril if SST Fumes Cool Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1975, 
at 32. After a period of public comment, the Secretary of Transportation provisionally approved 
SST flights from the two airports, but called the decision “difficult and close.” Robert B. Donin, 
Safety Regulation of the Concorde: Realistic Confinement of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 47 (1976) (quoting Secretary of Transportation, William T. Colman, Jr.). 
278




 See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 5 (1984) (assessing whether environmental 
impact statements have institutionalized “a greater sensitivity to environmental risks in the federal 
bureaucracy”). 
281
 Donin, supra note 277. 
282
 Although the Concorde was eventually approved, its flights were sharply curtailed in terms of 
both location and number and environmentalists consider it to have been a huge success. 
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action affecting the family. 283  However, the concept of an impact statement 
proved to have no ideological limits and the family impact statement was 
eventually taken over by advocates of “traditional values” during the Reagan 
administration. 284  At the same time, a number of safeguards representing 
conservative values were imposed by both Congress and the executive branch.285 
More recently, there has been increased progressive interest in the concept, and 
recent proposals have included an “interest impact statement” 286  and a 
“constitutional impact statement.”287 There has also been interest expressed at the 
state level. 288 Iowa, for example, has imposed the requirement of a “minority 
impact statement” whenever there is proposed legislation regarding sentencing.289 
 The example of Iowa’s minority impact statement as it applies to 
sentencing illustrates the importance and strength of demographic data. The 
impact statement legislation was introduced after statistics showed that Iowa 
ranked first among the states in its rate of incarceration for African Americans but 
had the third lowest rate of incarceration rate for white prisoners.290 A closer 
                                                 
283
 Robin S. Maril, Regulating The Family: The Impact Of Pro-Family Policymaking Assessments 
On Women And Nontraditional Families, BALT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
284




 Krishnakumar, supra note 132, at 30 (“Once a committee has submitted a legislative proposal 
and ‘interest impact’ statement to CBO/GAO, that entity then should be required to prepare an 
impact report evaluating: (1) the impact in qualitative and, if possible, quantitative terms, that the 
bill is expected to have on List groups; and (2) the benefits the bill is expected to confer on other 
groups.”).  
287
 See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 
DUKE L. J. 1277, 1310-11 (2001) (explaining a two-step procedure for all bills that would require a 
“constitutional impact statement”).  
288
 Iowa became the first state to enact a minority impact statement in 2008. U.S. State News, Gov. 
Culver Signs Nation’s First Racial Impact Sentencing Bill, Apr. 22, 2008 (issuing statement of 
Iowa Public Defender). When the Iowa minority impact statement bill was signed into law, the 
Iowa Public Defender noted that “Iowa is the first state to pass legislation examining the racial and 
ethnic impact of new criminal justice policies.” Id. He also observed that “Bills to enact minority 
impact statements are . . . pending in Connecticut and Illinois [and] [l]ast year, Oregon was the 
first state to introduce similar legislation.” Id. The impact statement concept has also been 
suggested in other areas, such as Medicaid. See, e.g., Michael Campbell, Did I Do That? An 
Argument for Requiring Pennsylvania to Evaluate the Racial Impact of Medicaid Policy Decisions 
Prior to Implementation, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1163 (2010) (recommending that “prior to publication 
of proposed regulations, the Medicaid agency first assesses the racial impact of its proposed 
policies and then presents these findings publicly”). 
289
 Gov. Culver Signs Nation’s First Racial Impact Sentencing Bill, U.S. STATE NEWS, Apr. 22, 
2008, 2008 WLNR 10805010 (explaining that the law “provides a means for legislators to 
anticipate any unwarranted disparities and enables them to consider alternative policies to 
accomplish the goals of legislation without causing undue negative effects on public safety”). 
290
 Criminal Justice & Juvenile Planning, Minority Impact Statements: One Approach to Racial 
Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, available at 
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inspection of the data showed that the point of departure was not in the rate of 
arrests or even convictions but that it occurred at the sentencing phase.291 The 
minority impact statement is required to accompany any legislation related to a 
“public offense, sentencing, or parole and probation procedures.”292 The statement 
must include: 
 
1) any disproportionate or unique impact of proposed policies or 
programs on minority persons in Iowa; 
2) a rationale for the existence of programs or policies having an 
impact on minority persons in Iowa; and 
3) evidence of consultation with representatives of minority 
persons in cases where a policy or program has an identifiable 
impact on minority persons in Iowa.293 
 
The specific requirements imposed through these impact statements 
represent a belief that the imposition of a predetermined policy lens can 
effectively direct and guide the development and implementation of policy. The 
articulation of impact is also consistent with the growing international 
commitment to gender mainstreaming that explores ways to develop an 
independent and official assessment of the gendered implications and 
consequences of specific plans or proposals.294 Following the existing models, a 
proto-typical diversity impact statement would include the following: 
 
1) the demographic impact of the proposed policies or actions; 
2) any disproportionate or unique impact of the proposed policies 
or actions on designated minority populations; 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.jrsa.org/events/conference/presentations-09/Phyllis_Blood.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 
2013). See also Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: States Rates of Incarceration by 
Race and Ethnicity, July 2007, available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincby raceandethnicity.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
291
 Criminal Justice & Juvenile Planning, Minority Impact Statements: One Approach to Racial 
Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, available at 
http://www.jrsa.org/events/conference/presentations-09/Phyllis_Blood.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 
2013).  
292
 The legislation also required any application for a grant from a state of Iowa agency to include 
a minority impact statement. Iowa Code § 8.11 (2013). The law defines “minorities” as 
“individuals who are women, persons with a disability, African Americans, Latinos, Asians or 
Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Alaskan Native Americans.” Iowa Code § 8.11.2.b. 
(2013).  
293
 Wayne Ford, Bills Push ‘One Iowa’ In Studying Minority Impact With Grants, Crime, DES 
MOINES REGISTER (IOWA), Apr. 1, 2008, at 11W. 
294
 Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37 (describing gender mainstreaming). 
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3) reasonable alternatives to the proposed policies or actions that 
do not have a disproportionate or unique impact on designated 
minority populations; 
4) the rationale for the existence of policies or actions having a 
disproportionate or unique impact on designated minority 
populations; and 
5) the relationship between such policies or actions and the long-
term goals of tax reform, including considerations of equity, 
efficiency, and ease of administration. 
 
 A diversity impact assessment would obviously impose an additional cost 
on federal decision making.295 One thing to consider is the level of specificity that 
would be required by the diversity impact assessment. On one hand, it would not 
be desirable to have a completely pro forma impact assessment.296 On the other 
hand, too much detail could prove to be an unnecessary drag on the legislative 
and regulatory process. Regardless of the degree of detail and specificity required, 
the notion of an impact assessment offers a formal way to impose a critical lens 
on federal policy making. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article outlines the essential framework of Critical Tax Policy—a new 
method of inquiry that incorporates the insights of a growing international tax 
equity movement as well as the observations of critical tax scholars who write 
from a diverse range of outsider perspectives. Such a project is timely given the 
renewed calls for fundamental tax reform in the wake of the Global Recession and 
accompanying austerity measures. Critical Tax Policy challenges the multiple 
assumptions of neutrality that undergird our present system of taxation and 
recognizes that facially neutral tax policy can reinforce existing inequities and 
                                                 
295
 The imposition of a diversity impact statement would greatly increase the paperwork burden. 
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) is required to report to the Congress on the paperwork burden imposed on the public by 
the Federal Government and on efforts to reduce that burden. Since the enactment of the original 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, OMB has complied with this reporting requirement by issuing 
an Information Collection Budget (“ICB”). The 2012 ICB reports on the paperwork burden 
imposed on the public during fiscal year 2011 and explores other issues pertaining to the 
implementation of the PRA. Office of Budget and Management, Information Collection Budget 
2012, (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/icb/icb_2012.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013). 
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 Maril, supra note 283 (noting that the requirement of the Family Impact Statement was often 
pro forma and conclusory). 
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biases. It also acknowledges the constitutive role of tax policy in the larger 
“blueprint for the aims and ambitions of the nation state.”297 
The overriding goal of Critical Tax Policy is to make tax policy more 
informed, transparent, and responsive to the needs of individual taxpayers. This 
Article suggests a number of ways that the development of tax policy would differ 
(both procedurally and substantively) if critical perspectives were incorporated 
from the earliest stages. It engages instances of explicit and implicit bias in 
existing tax provisions and the potential for bias in the case of discretionary 
actions. Specifically, this Article proposes three policy innovations or safeguards 
that draw on longstanding institutional practices and procedures: (1) enhanced 
information collection; (2) the creation of a diversity expenditure budget; and (3) 
the requirement of a diversity impact statement.   
All of these proposals would further the goals of Critical Tax Policy, but 
each of them comes with a separate set of costs and countervailing policy 
concerns. Accordingly, they do not represent a definitive way to implement the 
addition of a critical lens. At best, they should be regarded as a starting point in 
the ongoing project of building an informed, transparent and responsive approach 
to tax policy that incorporates considerations of difference and acknowledges its 
potential role in the perpetuation of inequality. 
                                                 
297
 MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 3 (crediting Joseph Schumpeter with the observation regarding the 
budget function). 
